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SUMMARY 
Media delivery and streaming over public and lossy networks are becoming 
practically very important, which is evident in many commercial services like Internet 
Protocol Televisions (IPTV), Video-on-Demand (VoD), video conferencing, Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and so on. However, the security issues like 
authentication are serious concerns for many users. Both the sender and the receiver 
would like to be assured that the received media is not modified by an unauthorized 
attacker, and any unauthorized modification should be detected. 
A conventional crypto-based digital signature scheme can be directly applied 
to a file (file-based) or each packet (packet-based). However, it does not work 
effectively for streaming media due to three reasons: 1) a file-based method is not 
tolerant to network loss while streaming media is usually encoded with error-
resilience techniques and therefore is tolerant to network loss; 2) a file-based method 
does not support the paradigm of continuous authentication as packets are being 
received; 3) a packet-based method imposes extra high complexity and overhead to 
the processing and the transmission of streaming media, which by itself takes huge 
computational power and bandwidth. 
To tackle the above issues, we first propose a Butterfly Authentication method 
which amortizes a digital signature among a group of packets which are connected as 
a butterfly graph. It has lower complexity, low overhead and very high verification 
probability even in the presence of packet loss, because it inherits the nice fault-
tolerance property from the butterfly graph. Furthermore, based on the Butterfly 
Authentication, we also propose a Generalized Butterfly Graph (GBG) for 
authentication, which supports arbitrary number of packets and arbitrary overhead, 
and at the same time retains the high verification probability of the Butterfly 
 xix 
Authentication. We experimentally show that the proposed Butterfly Authentication 
and the GBG Authentication methods outperform existing methods. 
However, the above methods and all existing methods assume that all packets 
are equally important and the quality of authenticated media is proportional to the 
verification probability, which is usually not true for streaming media. Therefore, we 
propose a Content-Aware Optimized Stream Authentication method, which optimizes 
the authentication graph to maximize the expected quality of the authenticated media. 
The optimized graph is constructed in such a way that the more important packets are 
allocated more authentication information and thereby have higher verification 
probability, and vice versa. Overall, it attempts to maximize the media quality for a 
given overhead, or conversely minimize the overhead for a given quality. 
Stream authentication imposes authentication dependency among packets, 
which implies that loss of one packet may cause other packets to not be verifiable. 
Conventional streaming techniques schedule packet transmissions (e.g., through re-
transmission or differentiated QoS service) such that more important packets are 
delivered with high probability. Nevertheless, conventional streaming techniques do 
not account for the authentication dependencies, and therefore, straightforward 
combinations of conventional streaming techniques and authentication methods 
produce highly sub-optimal performance. To tackle this problem, we propose the 
Rate-Distortion-Authentication (R-D-A) Optimized Streaming method that computes 
the packet transmission schedule based on both coding importance and authentication 
dependency. Simulation results show that the proposed R-D-A Optimized Streaming 
method significantly outperforms the straightforward combination when the available 
bandwidth drops below the source rate. 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 -  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis addresses the problem of providing quality-optimized authentication 
service for streaming media delivered over public and lossy packet networks. The 
problem has two aspects: security and quality. The former is to ensure that any 
unauthorized alteration to the media should be detected by a receiver, while the latter 
is to optimize media quality at the receiver. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Media delivery and streaming over public networks are becoming practically more 
and more important, enabled by rapidly increasing network bandwidth (especially at 
the last mile, e.g. DSL, W-CDMA, CDMA2000, WLAN, etc), huge number of users 
with Internet access (over 1 billion users as of March 2007 [1]), advanced media 
compression standards [2][6], and advances in network delivery technologies such as 
content-delivery networks [11] and peer-to-peer (P2P) systems [12][13][14]. This is 
also evident in many commercial services like Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), 
Peer-to-Peer Television (P2PTV), Video-on-Demand (VoD), video conferencing, 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and so on. However, security issues like 
confidentiality and authentication are serious concerns for many users. For instance, 
the sender would like to be assured that the transmitted media can be viewed by 
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authorized people only, and the receiver would like to be assured that the received 
media is, indeed, from the right sender and that it has not been altered by an 
unauthorized third party. The confidentiality issue has been addressed by various 
research works in recent years [15][16][17][19]. Recently, ISO/IEC published a new 
standard called JPEG 2000 Part-8: Secure JPEG 2000 [4], also known as JPSEC. It 
addresses security services for JPEG 2000 images and at the same time allows the 
protected image to retain all JPEG 2000 system features like scalability, simple 
transcodability and progression to lossless. However, JPSEC does not address the 
packet loss issue. This thesis examines the problem of authenticating streaming media 
delivered over public and lossy networks. 
Throughout this thesis, the term authentication implicitly means three things: 
integrity, origin authentication and non-repudiation. With integrity, a receiver should 
be able to detect if the received message has been modified in transit, that is, an 
attacker should not be able to substitute a false message for a legitimate one. Origin 
authentication enables a receiver to ascertain the origin of the received message, and 
an attacker should not be able to masquerade as someone else. Non-repudiation means 
that a sender should not be able to later falsely deny that he sent a message. 
Digital signature schemes like Digital Signature Scheme (DSA) [18] are well-
known solutions for data authentication. A sender is associated with two keys: a 
private key and a public key. The private key is used by the sender to sign a message 
while the public key is used by a receiver to verify a message. For example, if Alice 
wants to send a message to Bob, she signs the message using her private key and 
sends to Bob together with the generated signature. Bob then uses Alice’s public key 
to verify whether the received message matches the signature. If the message is 
modified in transit, it will not be able to pass the verification, hence integrity is 
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ensured. Since the private key is known to Alice only, no one else is able to generate a 
signature matching the message, and therefore Bob is able to ascertain it is indeed 
from Alice (origin authentication). Further, Alice cannot deny the message is sent by 
her (non-repudiation). 
Digital signature schemes work neither effectively nor efficiently for 
streaming media, because the typical requirement assumed for data authentication that 
the received data must be exactly the same as what was sent by the sender, is not 
appropriate or practical for many uses of media authentication. Conventional digital 
signature schemes are not tolerant to network loss, and even a single-bit difference 
may cause the received media not to pass the verification. However, streaming media 
is usually encoded with error-resilient techniques [5][25] and is tolerant to a certain 
level of network loss that is unavoidable when it is delivered over an unreliable 
channel like a  UDP connection. When network loss occurs, the received media may 
have degraded but still acceptable quality. It is desirable that the authentication 
solution should be able to verify the degraded media, so long as no packet is 
modified. 
 
Figure 1-1 – Media transmission over lossy channel 
 
 4 
Figure 1-1 illustrates the typical scenario for media communication over a 
lossy channel. At the sender side, the original media is encoded into a stream, which 
is basically a sequence of packets. Before network transmission, the packets are then 
wrapped in datagrams whose size is no larger than the Maximum Transmission Unit 
(MTU). A packet might be split into more than one datagram. Throughout the thesis, 
we denote a “packet” as a data unit generated by the media encoding process, and a 
“datagram” as the basic network transmission unit. At the receiver, received 
datagrams are used to assemble the packets. As the network is lossy, some datagrams 
may be lost in transit, resulting in corruption of the corresponding packets. Finally, 
received packets are decoded to reconstruct the media, where various error 
concealment techniques [5][25] can be applied to recover from the loss. 
As illustrated in Figure 1-1, authentication can be achieved at two different 
levels: content level and stream level. The authentication at content level, also known 
as content authentication [20][21][22][23][24], has access to the media content. It 
extracts and signs key features of the media, which are invariant when the media 
undergoes content-preserving manipulations like re-compression, format conversion 
and certain levels of network loss. Therefore, content authentication is robust against 
the distortion introduced by re-compression and channel transmission. However, it is 
generally more difficult to make useful and mathematically provable statements about 
the system security for a content authentication method. As shown in Figure 1-2(a), 
there exists the possibility that an authentic media is falsely detected as unauthentic 




Figure 1-2 – Content Authentication versus Stream Authentication 
 
The authentication at stream level, also known as stream authentication, has 
access to the packets only. Since stream authentication is achieved using 
cryptographic hash (like SHA-1) and signature (like DSA) methods [18], it provides a 
similar level of security to conventional data security techniques, and very 
importantly provides a mathematically provable level of security. Unlike content 
authentication, stream authentication has no false rejection or false acceptance, as 
shown in Figure 1-2(b). 
Figure 1-3 illustrates two simple methods to authenticate stream packets. In 
the first method in Figure 1-3(a), each packet carries its own signature and thereby 
each received packet is individually verifiable. However, its disadvantage is the high 
complexity and overhead, as cryptographic signature operations require high 
computation power and its size is in the order of hundreds of bytes. In the second 
method, a single signature is computed from a bit string which is the concatenation of 
all packets. While it has very low complexity and low overhead, it does not tolerate 
any packet loss, i.e., any packet loss causes all other packets not to be verifiable. 
 6 
 
Figure 1-3 - Simple methods to authenticate stream packets 
 
The above two methods are two extreme cases for stream authentication: the 
first one has very high robustness but also very high complexity and overhead, while 
the second one has very low complexity and overhead but also very low robustness. 
More sophisticated methods exist to achieve a trade-off between robustness, overhead 
and complexity, which can be classified into Erasure-code-based authentication 
[26][28] and graph-based authentication [29][31][33][34]. 
The Erasure-code-based authentication method computes a single digital 
signature from the hash values of the individual packets. To prevent loss of 
authentication data, Error Correction Code (ECC) algorithm is applied to the digital 
signature and hash values. The resulting ECC codeword is then divided into segments 
piggybacking onto the packets transmitted to the receiver. Thus, in the presence of 
packet loss, the receiver may still be able to recover the authentication data and verify 
the received packets. The more redundancy added by ECC coding, the more robust it 
is against packet loss. More details of Erasure-code-based authentication can be found 
in Section 2.1.2.1. 
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Graph-based stream authentication connects packets as a Directed Acyclic 
Graph (DAG), where packets correspond to nodes. A directed edge from packet A to 
packet B is realized by appending A’s hash (one-way hash) to B. There is only one 
packet carrying the digital signature (which is referred to as signature packet), and 
each packet has at least one directed path to the signature packet. At the receiver side, 
the lost packets are removed from the graph and a packet is verifiable if it has at least 
one directed path to the signature packet. In order to increase the robustness against 
packet loss, we have to add more redundant edges in the graph. An example of graph-
based stream authentication is given in Figure 1-4. The graph-based authentication 
has low complexity, because it requires only one signature operation for all packets 
and one hashing operation per packet. In addition, it has either lower sender delay or 
lower receiver delay, depending on whether the signature packet is the first or last one 
to be sent. This thesis examines graph-based stream authentication in more details. 
 
 
Figure 1-4 – An example of graph-based stream authentication 
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1.2 PRELIMINARIES 
1.2.1 Security Related Concepts 
Authentication, Integrity and Non-repudiation 
Usually authentication is associated with data integrity, origin authentication, and 
non-repudiation, because these issues are very often related to each other: Data which 
has been altered should effectively have a new source; and if the source cannot be 
determined, then the question of alteration cannot be settled either. Typical methods 
for providing data authentication are digital signature schemes (DSS) and message 
authentication codes (MAC). Digital signatures use an asymmetric (public/private) 
key pair, while MACs use a symmetric (private) key. Both DSS and MAC techniques 
build upon the use of one-way hash functions. 
In one-to-one communication scenario, the symmetric key (i.e., with MAC) is 
shared by the sender and the receiver, and is unknown to any third party. Thus, the 
receiver is assured that the received message is indeed from the sender as long as the 
MAC matches the received message, since the sender is the only party (besides the 
receiver) who knows the key. However, in one-to-many communication scenario, the 
symmetric key is shared by more than two parties and the MAC can be generated by 
any party who has the key. Thus, there is no way for a receiver to be assured of the 
origin of the received message. The asymmetric key (i.e., DSS) works for both one-
to-one and one-to-many communication scenario, because only the sender has the 
private key used to generate the signature. 
Further, DSS provides non-repudiation but MAC cannot. In the case of 
asymmetric key (i.e., DSS), the sender’s private key, which is used to generate 
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signature, is not known to any other party. Thus, the signature generated with DSS 
cannot be forged and non-repudiation is automatically provided. However, with 
symmetric key (i.e., MAC), the same key is used by a sender to generate a signature 
and also used by a receiver for verification. Given a signature, it is not possible to tell 
who generated it. 
One-way Hash Function 
A one-way hash function or cryptographic hash works only in one direction to 
generate a fixed-length bit-string for any given data with arbitrary size. These hash 
functions guarantee that even a one-bit change in the data will result in a totally 
different hash value. Therefore, the use of a hash function provides a convenient 
technique to identify if the data has changed. Further, by “one-way” we mean that it is 
computationally easy to compute a hash from a message and it is computationally 
infeasible to find the message for a given hash. Typical hash functions include MD5 
(128bits) and SHA-1 (160bits). 
A good one-way hash function is also collision-free, i.e., it is hard to generate 
two messages with the same hash value. One-way hash is quite a primitive operation 
in the cryptography world. For example, a digital signature is usually generated from 
a hash value (one-way hash) computed from a message, instead of directly generated 
from the message.  
Message Authentication Code 
A message authentication code (MAC) is a one-way hash function with the addition 
of a secret key. To prevent an attacker from both changing the data and replacing the 
original hash value with a new one associated with the new data, keyed hash functions 
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are used where the hash is computed from a combination of the original data and a 
secret key.  As discussed previously, due to the nature of symmetric key, MAC does 
not provide origin authentication in one-to-many communication scenario, and it does 
not provide non-repudiation, either. 
Digital Signature Scheme 
The digital signature scheme (DSS) includes 1) a procedure for computing the digital 
signature at the sender using the sender’s private key, and; 2) a procedure for 
verification of the signature at the receiver using the associated public key. 
Computing a digital signature is very computationally expensive, and depends on the 
length of the data being signed. Therefore, instead of directly signing the data, the 
typical approach is to compute a one-way hash of the data and then sign the hash 
value. Public key DSS is a common technology and has been adopted as an 
international standard for data authentication, where the private key is used for 
signature generation and the public key is used for signature verification. The 
generated signature is usually about 1024bits. As discussed previously, the 
asymmetric key pair enables DSS to provide integrity, origin authentication and non-
repudiation at the same time. 
Media Data versus Media Content 
Given a specific type of multimedia (e.g., image), the term media “data” refers to its 
exact representation (e.g., binary bitstream) while the term media “content” refers to 
the semantics of the same data representation. The term semantics refers to the aspects 
of meaning that are expressed in a language, code, or other form of media 
representation. For example, after lossy compression the original and reconstructed 
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media data is different, however the media content or media semantics should be the 
same (e.g., the same people are visible in both the original and reconstructed image). 
Semantics measurement is generally subjective, and is a function of the specific 
applications. For example, matching or similarity score is the most common one used 
in pattern recognition.  
Incidental Distortion versus Intentional Distortion 
Incidental distortion refers to the distortion introduced from coding and 
communication like compression, transcoding, and packet loss, etc. Intentional 
distortion refers to the distortion introduced by malicious attacks like image copy-
paste (e.g., changing the text in a picture), packet insertion, etc. In some applications, 
the goal of the authentication scheme is to tolerate incidental distortions (i.e., all 
affected media caused by incidental distortions will still be deemed as authentic 
media) while rejecting or identifying intentional distortions. Sometimes, the 
intentional distortion is also referred to as attack. 
Content Authentication 
The term “content authentication” refers to verifying that the meaning of the media 
(the “content” or semantics) has not changed, in contrast to data authentication which 
considers whether the data has not changed.  This notion is useful because the 
meaning of the media is based on its content instead of its exact data representation. 
This form of authentication is motivated by applications where it is acceptable to 
manipulate the data without changing the meaning of the content. Lossy compression 
is an example.  
 12 
Stream Authentication 
The term “Stream authentication” refers to a process to verify that a sequence of 
packets (or a stream) transmitted over a public and lossy network has not been altered 
by an unauthorized third party, while tolerating packet loss to occur in transit. The 
basic idea is to amortize a digital signature among a group of packets to reduce 
complexity and overhead, and at the same time remain robust against packet loss. 
Stream authentication can be classified into erasure-code-based stream authentication 
and graph-based stream authentication. The former applies Error Correction Coding 
to protect authentication data (digital signature and hash values) from network loss, 
while the latter adds redundant paths to the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) to protect 
authentication data from network loss. 
Authenticated Media 
Authenticated media is defined as the media decoded from received and authenticated 
packets only. That is, a packet received but not verified will be equivalent to loss. 
This definition prevents packets from alteration and assumes packet loss is not 
malicious. Note that packet loss could be due to various factors like congestion and 
transmission bit error. Throughout this thesis, we assume packet loss is not malicious 
due to: 1) It may not be possible to tell whether a packet loss is caused by network or 
by a malicious attacker; 2) Media stream is tolerant to packet loss, which might be 
concealed using various error-resilience and error-concealment techniques. 
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1.2.2 Media Coding and Streaming 
This section gives a brief overview of the latest media formats including the JPEG 
2000 image coding standard and the H.264/AVC video coding standard. 
JPEG 2000 Images Coding Standard 
JPEG 2000 [2] is the latest image coding standard by the Joint Picture Expert Group 
(JPEG), which is to provide a new image representation with rich set of features, all 
supported within the same compressed bit-stream. The JPEG 2000 standard can 
address a variety of existing and emerging applications, including server/client image 
communication, medical imagery, military/surveillance, and so on. Compared with 
the baseline JPEG standard, the JPEG 2000 standard supports the following set of 
features: 
• Improved compression efficiency 
• Lossy to lossless compression 
• Multiple resolution representation 
• Embedded bit-stream (progressive decoding and SNR scalability) 
• Titling 
• Region-of-Interest (ROI) coding 
• Error resilience 
• Random codestream access and processing 
• A more flexible file format 
The JPEG 2000 standard employs Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) to 
transform an image into resolutions and sub-bands, followed by quantization. The 
quantized coefficients are then arranged into codeblocks. Figure 1-5 illustrates how an 
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image of 256x256 pixels is decomposed into three resolutions and each sub-band 
consists of codeblocks of 64x64 coefficients. 
The quantized coefficients are coded in two tiers. In Tier-1, each codeblock is 
encoded independently. The coefficients are bit-plane encoded, starting from the most 
significant bit-plane all the way to the least significant bit-plane. Furthermore, all bit-
planes except the most significant one are split into three sub-bit-plane passes (coding 
passes), where the information that results in largest reduction in distortion will be 
encoded first. Each coding pass is associated with a distortion increment, the amount 
by which the total distortion will decrease if the coding pass is correctly decoded 
towards the reconstructed image. 
 
Figure 1-5 – JPEG 2000 resolutions, sub-bands, codeblocks, bit-planes and coding passes 
 
The Tier-2 coding introduces another three structures, layers, precincts and 
packets. The layers enable SNR scalability and each layer includes a number of 
consecutive coding passes contributed by individual codeblocks. The precinct is a 
collection of spatially contiguous codeblocks from all sub-bands at a particular 
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resolution. All the coding passes that belong to a particular precinct and a particular 
layer constitute a packet. 
The distortion increment of a packet is the summation of the distortion 
increments of all coding passes that constitute the packet. Furthermore, within the 
same precinct, a high-layer packet will depend on all the lower-layer packets for 
decoding (i.e., simple linear dependency). The distortion increment, together with 
dependency relationship, is used to measure the importance of a packet in a JPEG 
2000 image. 
More details of JPEG 2000 standard can be found in [3]. 
H.264/AVC Video Coding Standard 
H.264/AVC [6][7] is the latest international video coding standard by ITU-T Video 
Coding Expert Group (VCEG) and the ISO/IEC Moving Picture Experts Group 
(MPEG). This new standard is designed for higher compression efficiency and 
network-friendliness. Therefore, the H.264/AVC standard can be used for applications 
like video broadcasting, video conference, video-on-demand, video streaming service, 
multimedia messaging service, and so on. Compared with prior video coding 
standards, H.264/AVC has many new features, some of which are highlighted as 
follows: 
• Higher compression efficiency, achieved by using various motion 
compensation techniques like quarter-sample-accurate, variable block-
size and multiple reference pictures. 
• Enhanced error-resiliency, achieved by using techniques like Network 
abstraction layer (NAL), parameter set structure, flexible slice size, 
flexible macroblock ordering (FMO), and so on. 
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The H.264/AVC has a Video Coding Layer (VCL), which is designed to 
efficiently represent the video content, and a Network Abstraction Layer (NAL), 
which formats the VCL representation of the video in such a way that it is convenient 
and efficient to be transported by different networks. 
In the VCL layer, a picture is partitioned into fixed-size macroblocks (a 16x16 
rectangular area), which are the basic building blocks of the standard. A slice is a 
sequence of macroblocks which are processed in the raster-scan order. A picture may 
be split into one or several slices. Slices are self-contained in the sense in that a slice 
can be correctly decoded without the use of data from other slices in the same picture. 
The slices can be coded with different coding types as follows: 
• I-Slice: A slice in which all macroblocks are coded using intra 
predication, i.e., prediction from the samples in the same picture. 
• P-Slice: In addition to the coding types in I-Slice, a P-Slice also has 
some macroblocks coded using inter-predication (i.e., prediction from 
the samples in different pictures) with at most one motion-
compensated predication signal per predication block. 
• B-Slice: In addition to the coding types in P-Slice, a B-slice has some 
macroblocks coded using inter-prediction with two motion-
compensated prediction signals per prediction block. 
The coding dependency is very complicated in H.264/AVC, because any I-
slice, P-slice or B-slice may be used for prediction of some other slices. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that a slice may depends on more than one slice. 
The Network Abstraction Layer (NAL) is to provide “network friendliness” to 
enable simple and effective customization of the use of VCL for a broad variety of 
systems. The NAL structure of H.264/AVC facilitates the ability to map VCL data to 
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transport layers such as RTP/UDP/IP for real-time wire-line and wireless network 
service, File format, H.32X and MPEG-2 systems for broadcasting service. 
The coded video data is organized into NAL units, each of which is effectively 
a packet that contains an integer number of bytes. The NAL units can be classified 
into VCL and non-VCL NAL units. The VCL NAL units contain the data that 
represent the values of the samples in the video pictures, and the non-VCL NAL units 
contain any associated additional information such as parameter sets and 
supplemental enhancement information. 
Similar to the JPEG 2000 packets, each VCL NAL unit is associated with a 
distortion increment, the amount by which the total distortion will decrease if the 
NAL unit is correctly decoded. In addition, the NAL units also have inter-
dependency. For example, a VCL NAL unit may depend on a non-VCL NAL unit 
containing parameter set information, and a VCL NAL unit containing a P-Slice or B-
Slice may depends on some other NAL units for motion compensation. Therefore, the 
importance of each packet can be measured by the distortion increment associated 
with each NAL unit and the dependency relationship among them. 
More details of H.264/AVC can be found in [7] and [8]. 
Media Delivery versus Media Streaming 
The term “media delivery” refers to a process where every media packet is simply 
transmitted once to a receiver, which is not adaptive to network condition and packet 
importance. All packets are treated equally for network transmission. Media delivery 
is typically used for static media like JPEG 2000 image data that has no strict timing 
requirement. The term “media streaming” refers to a more sophisticated process 
where the sender actively schedules packet transmission based on network condition 
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and packet importance. For instance, the sender could allocate more transmission 
opportunities to more important packets, or actively prune less important packets 
when network is congested. Further, packet transmission is scheduled to satisfy 
timing requirement. Media stream is more appropriate for media like H.264/AVC 
video, where each frame must be delivered before a specific deadline in order to 
ensure a smooth play out at the receiver. 
1.2.3 Channel Model 
Throughout the thesis, the channel is modeled as an independent time-invariant packet 
erasure channel. Time-invariant channel means that the packet loss probability and 
delay are independent of the time when the packet is injected into the channel. The 
term “Packet erasure channel” refers to a transmission channel where a packet can be 
either received correctly or lost in transmit. It models the end-to-end communication 
channel based on UDP/IP, which is often used to for media communication. In the 
UDP/IP protocol stack, the MAC header and the IP header include a checksum field 
for error detection and correction. A packet received with error will be dropped and it 
appears be lost to the application layer. Only packets received correctly are passed to 
the application layers. Therefore, from application point of view, a UDP/IP-based 
channel can be considered as a packet erasure channel. 
Packet loss is most likely caused by buffer overflow at intermediate routers at 
the time of congestion or caused by active packet dropping by routers to avoid 
network congestion. If a packet is not lost, its forward trip time, from the time it is 
sent out to the time it is delivered to the receiver, consists of the queuing delay in the 
intermediate routers and the propagation delay in the network link. Usually, the 
forward trip time follows a Shifted Gamma distribution. 
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For a media delivery scenario (for static media like image), only loss 
probability is considered, because packets do not have strict timing requirement. For 
example, in an image communication system, all packets of an image share the same 
deadline, which is usually quite relaxed. In this case, packet delay is less important. 
However, for a media streaming scenario (for media like video and audio), packets 
have more strict deadlines and they must be delivered before their respective deadline 
to ensure a smooth play out at the receiver. A packet received after its deadline is 
equivalent to loss. Therefore, both packet loss probability and delay have to be 
considered. The effective packet loss probability ε  is computed by Eq(1.1), where t is 
packet arrival time and τ is the deadline. 
( ) ( )( ) ( )Pr 1 Pr Pr |lost lost t not lostε τ= + − >                                  (1.1) 
1.2.4 Attack Model 
Packets transmitted over public network can be captured and modified by 
unauthorized party. The possible attack can be summarized as follows: 
Packet Modification 
A packet can be modified or replaced with another packet, which may lead to changed 
streaming media content. For example, when a packet corresponding to a region of an 
image is modified, the image transmitted by the sender and the image viewed by the 
receiver may have different semantic meaning. Packet modification should be 
detected by a receiver. 
Packet Insertion 
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The attacker can insert new packets that do not belong to the original streaming 
media, which may also change the media content. For example, for video streaming, 
the attacker can insert one or more packets corresponding to additional frames, and 
the receiver may perceive additional motion that is not present in original media. 
Packet insertion should be detected by a receiver. 
Packet Removal 
The attacker can also remove packets that belong to the original stream media. 
However, it is difficult to tell whether packet loss is due to “packet removal” attack or 
due to network loss. As various error-resilience and concealment techniques [5][25] 
are available to recover from packet loss, the streaming media can still be 
reconstructed in the presence of certain levels of packet loss, although with degraded 
quality. Therefore, we assume packet loss is not malicious throughout this thesis. 
1.2.5 Performance Metrics 
The performance metrics for stream authentication are summarized as follows: 
 
Verification probability: Probability that a received packet is also verifiable. Ideally, 
all received packets can be verified, however, this requires high overhead and 
computational complexity, motivating the need for alternative techniques which also 
provide high verification probability but at significantly lower costs. Verification 
probability is used to measure robustness against network loss. A higher verification 
probability indicates higher robustness against packet loss. 
Complexity: The computational resources required to sign the stream packets at the 
sender and to verify the received packets at the receiver. As the media stream 
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typically involves a huge amount of continuous packets, this requirement becomes 
even more critical when the receiver is a mobile device with limited computational 
capabilities. Since signature generation and verification are computationally 
expensive, the complexity is usually closely related to the number of signature 
operations required at the sender and receiver. 
Overhead: The additional information associated with the authentication information 
transmitted along with the media packets. The additional information may include 
MAC values, digital signatures, or hashes. It is important to minimize this overhead, 
especially in settings where the available network bandwidth is limited. 
Sender delay: The additional delay placed on a packet before it can be transmitted 
because of the authentication processing (e.g., processing a block of packets). In real-
time communication scenarios, a high sender delay often requires a large buffer at the 
sender. For pre-recorded media, e.g., in Video-on-Demand and media broadcast 
scenario, the signing process can be done off-line, and hence sender delay does not 
matter. 
Receiver delay: The delay from the time when a packet is received to the time when it 
can be verified by the receiver. A high receiver delay often requires a large buffer at 
the receiver. For streaming media, usually each packet has an associated playout 
deadline after which it becomes useless, therefore it is desirable to design the 
authentication method such that the receiver delay does not result in a packet missing 
its deadline. 
Media quality: The quality of authenticated media at the receiver side, measured as 
Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR). Assuming packets are equally important, the 
media quality is proportional to the verification probability. However, in reality, the 
importance of media packets varies a lot, leading to a situation where media received 
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with higher verification probability might have lower media quality than the same 
media received with lower verification probability, depending on whether or not the 
important packets pass the verification. For media, we argue that media quality is a 
more meaning performance metric, because the quality matters to human perception. 
Note that verification probability and overhead are competing goals. It is 
desirable to have minimal overhead and maximal verification probability. To increase 
the verification probability, one has to add more redundancy for authentication data, 
leading to higher overhead. Thus, a good authentication scheme has to balance these 
two metrics. Similarly, the sender delay and receiver delay are also competing goals. 
In graph-based stream authentication, if a signature packet is the first packet to be 
sent, sender delay is high and receiver delay is low. Otherwise, sender delay is low 
and receiver is high. 
1.3 MOTIVATIONS 
In general, the motivation of this thesis is to provide a practical solution to 
authenticate media with optimized quality at the receiver in the presence of network 
loss. A media stream comprises a sequence of packets transmitted over the network. 
A received packet can be classified into four categories: 1) verified packet; 2) lost 
packet; 3) modified packet; and 4) unverifiable packets. The authenticated media is 
reconstructed from verified packets only. The lost packets are due to network 
condition such as congestion and fading channel, which is out of the scope of this 
thesis. The modified packets and unverifiable packets are discarded due to security 
concerns. The unverified packets are due to incomplete authentication data, caused by 
network loss. Recall that authentication data piggybacks onto the packets, and 
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therefore packet loss will lead to partial loss of authentication data. This thesis studies 
the problem of how to minimize the number of unverifiable packets, in order to 
maximize the quality of authenticated media at the receiver. 
More specific motivations of this thesis are summarized as follows: 
1.3.1 Optimized Verification Probability 
In a simple media delivery scenario, packets are simply transmitted over a network 
and, therefore, every packet is subjected to network loss with a certain probability. 
Packet loss leads to incomplete authentication data, which in turn leads to unverifiable 
packets. In order to reduce the number of unverifiable packets (i.e., to increase 
verification probability), we need to make the authentication data more robust against 
packet loss by adding more redundancy (i.e., more overhead). Therefore, a trade-off 
exists in stream authentication between overhead and verification probability. In 
general, the greater the overhead is, the higher the verification probability. Ideally, it 
is desirable to have an authentication method with very low overhead and at the same 
time very high verification probability. But in reality, we have to find a balance 
between overhead and verification probability. The problem is to find an optimal 
operation points such that the verification probability is maximized for a given 
overhead, or conversely the overhead is minimized for a given verification 
probability. 
1.3.2 Optimized Media Quality 
Media packets have unequal importance, i.e., some packets have higher importance 
than the other packets in terms of their impact to the quality of the reconstructed 
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media. For example, in a video stream, loss of an I-frame packet will have error 
propagation to all subsequent packets until the next I-frame. Therefore, I-frame 
packets are much more important than P-frame and B-frame packets. Similarly, P-
frame packets are more important than B-frame packets. Further, two packets of the 
same type may also have different importance, depending on video motion. Therefore, 
we argue that media quality should be used to measure the performance of an 
authentication method for media, instead of verification probability, because media 
quality matters to human perception. It is desirable to have an authentication method 
such that more important packets have high verification probability, and vice versa. In 
other words, the packet importance information is utilized to design an authentication 
method such that more important packets are allocated with more overhead and hence 
have higher verification probability. This will result in more optimized allocation of 
overhead and subsequently better media quality at the receiver. 
1.3.3 Alignment of Coding Dependency and Authentication Dependency 
It is well known that packets inherit coding dependency from the media encoding 
process, i.e., a packet may need another packet for decoding. For example, in a JPEG 
2000 stream, a packet in a higher layer depends on the corresponding packets in the 
lower layers for decoding. On the other hand, stream authentication also imposes 
dependency among packets, that is, verification of one packet may depend on some 
other packets. If the coding dependency is not aligned with authentication 
dependency, the receiver might get some packets which are decodable but 
unverifiable, or verifiable but not decodable. However, a packet is useful if and only 
if it is both decodable and verifiable. An example of misalignment is when two 
packets (A and B) have corresponding coding and authentication dependency, that is, 
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A depends on B for decoding and B depends on A for verification. Loss of one packet 
causes the other packet to be useless (either unverifiable or not decodable). Therefore, 
the problem is to design the authentication method that aligns the authentication 
dependency with the coding dependency. 
1.3.4 Joint Streaming and Authentication 
The Rate-Distortion Optimized (RaDiO) Media Streaming technique [38][41] 
schedules packet transmissions based on packet coding dependency, coding 
importance, packet size and playout deadline. Stream authentication ensures that only 
authenticated packets are used to reconstruct the media at the receiver, and it imposes 
authentication overhead and dependency among packets. It is desirable to have R-D 
optimized quality for the authenticated media. However, straightforward 
concatenation of RaDiO and stream authentication produces highly sub-optimal 
performance because RaDiO does not account for authentication dependency and 
overhead. For example, given two packets A and B, where A has higher coding 
importance than B and A depends on B for verification, RaDiO will assign more 
transmission opportunities to packet A and fewer opportunities to packet B. However, 
packet A cannot be verified unless packet B is received. To get optimized media 
quality, we have to take into consideration authentication overhead and dependency, 
besides the original attributes used by RaDiO. 
1.4 MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS 
The major contributions of the thesis are summarized as follows: 
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1.4.1 Butterfly Authentication 
For stream authentication, there exists a trade-off between the overhead and the 
verification probability. It is desirable to find a balance point where the verification 
probability is maximized for a given overhead, or the overhead is minimized for a 
given verification probability. Thus, we need to design an authentication graph to 
connect the packets in such a way that each received packet has a path to the signature 
packet with high probability. Towards this goal, we propose a Butterfly 
Authentication method based on butterfly graph which is commonly used in 
communication networks for parallel computer and distributed system. In a butterfly 
graph, every node/packet is connected to two other packets/nodes that are independent 
of each other for authentication (referred to as independency property), and thereby 
maximize its verification probability. 
We experimentally show that the butterfly graph is a near-optimal graph when 
the overhead is around 2 hashes per packet. We developed a greedy algorithm to build 
an authentication graph step by step. At each step, the greedy algorithm considers all 
possibilities of adding one more edge to the graph and chooses the edge that gives the 
highest average verification probability. At some point when the overhead reaches 2 
hashes per packet, the resulting graph is similar to a butterfly graph in the sense that it 
has the independency property. In addition, experimental results also show that the 
Butterfly Authentication has higher verification probability than existing graph-based 
methods when overhead at 2 hashes per packet. 
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1.4.2 Generalized Butterfly Graph Authentication 
Although the Butterfly Authentication method has higher verification probability than 
existing graph-based methods, it also has several limitations: 1) The number of nodes 
in a butterfly graph is not flexible; 2) The overhead of butterfly graph is not flexible 
either (i.e., fixed at 2 hashes per packet); 3) The signature packet grows with the total 
number of packets in the graph. If the signature packet is bigger than a MTU, it has to 
be segmented for transmission – increasing its loss probability and negatively 
impacting all other packets. To overcome the above 3 limitations of Butterfly 
Authentication, we propose the GBG authentication graph. 
Compared with the Butterfly Authentication graph, the GBG graph supports 
arbitrary overhead and arbitrary number of packets, and the signature packet does not 
grow with the total number of packets. The GBG framework supports a wide range of 
possible authentication graphs, and the problem of finding the best authentication 
graph for a given situation corresponds to a design problem. The input parameters 
include the total number of packets, packet loss rate and overhead budget. The output 
parameters include the number of rows/columns, edge placement and the number of 
transmissions for the signature packet. 
In addition, we also propose a new evaluation metric called the Loss-
Amplification-Factor (LAF), defined as the ratio of effective loss rate over packet loss 
rate. The effective loss rate accounts for both lost packets and packets which are 
received but not verifiable. The LAF measures the extent to which the authentication 
method exacerbates the effective loss rate. Ideally, the LAF would equal to 1, i.e., all 
received packet are verifiable. The closer the LAF for an authentication method is to 
1, the greater its robustness is against network loss. 
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Experimental results demonstrate that the GBG authentication method has 
significant performance improvement over existing graph-based methods like EMSS 
and Augmented Chain. 
1.4.3 Content-aware Optimized Stream Authentication 
We argue that a more appropriate evaluation metric should be the media quality (i.e., 
Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio, or PSNR) for a stream authentication method, because 
the quality (instead of verification probability) matters for human perception. If it is 
assumed that all packets are equally important, the verification probability is actually 
equivalent to media quality. However, media packets usually have varying 
importance, and some packets are more important than the others. This naturally 
motivates us to allocate more redundant authentication information for the more 
important packets in order to maximize their verification probability and thereby 
maximize the overall media quality. 
Towards this goal, with awareness of media content, we formulate an 
optimization framework to compute an authentication graph to minimize the expected 
distortion (i.e., to maximize the expected quality) at the receiver, given an overhead 
and packet loss rate. In other words, the distortion-overhead performance of an 
optimized authentication graph lies in the convex hull of the set of all distortion-
overhead performances. As an example, we show how to compute an optimized 
authentication graph for a JPEG 2000 image, and how to align the coding dependency 
(between different layers) with the authentication dependency. In view that the 
optimization process has high computational complexity, we also propose a simplified 
authentication graph construction method that requires much lower complexity. 
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Through system analysis and simulation, we demonstrate that the proposed 
scheme achieves an R-D curve of the authenticated media which is very close to the 
R-D curve when no authentication is required, and it substantially outperforms 
existing schemes at all bit-rates and packet loss rates. 
1.4.4 Rate-Distortion-Authentication Optimized Streaming 
When conventional RaDiO techniques are applied to a media stream protected using 
graph-based authentication method, they produce highly sub-optimal performances 
for authenticated video, because they optimize rate and distortion only, where the 
“rate” includes the data rate of coded media data and the “distortion” is measured by 
the difference between the original media and the media decoded from all received 
packets. For a media stream protected with a graph-based authentication method, each 
packet is associated with two more parameters: authentication importance and 
overhead size. Authentication importance is the additional expected distortion 
increment due to the unverifiable packets caused by packet loss, and the overhead size 
is the size (in bytes) of the authentication data appended to this packet. Conventional 
RaDiO techniques do not consider authentication and, therefore, are referred to as 
authentication-unaware techniques. 
We propose the Rate-Distortion-Authentication (R-D-A) optimized streaming 
technique to achieve optimized quality for authenticated media. The R-D-A 
Optimization is defined as the rate-distortion optimization for authenticated video, 
where the “rate” includes data rate for coded media data and the authentication 
overhead and the “distortion” is measured by the difference between the original 
media and the authenticated media. The R-D-A optimization method is able to achieve 
optimized performance for authenticated video as it accounts for authentication 
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importance and overhead size. Considering that R-D-A Optimization has high 
complexity, we subsequently propose a low-complexity algorithm, whose 
performance is close to the fully-blown algorithm. Lastly, we also propose an 
extension to the R-D-A Optimization framework that considered multiple deadlines 
associated with each packet. 
We conduct simulations to compare the R-D-A Optimized method and the 
authentication-unaware method. The experimental results demonstrate that the R-D-A 
Optimized method outperforms the authentication-unaware methods. Indeed, the R-D-
A Optimized method is the only method that works at low bandwidth. The 
authentication-unaware methods do not work at low bandwidth, as the media quality 
drops quickly to unacceptable level when the bandwidth drops below the source rate. 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of related works, including various methods for 
stream authentication and the state-of-the-art media streaming techniques. For stream 
authentication, we describe and compare both the erasure-code-based and graph-based 
authentication. Then, we describe the Rate-Distortion Optimize (RaDiO) streaming 
techniques. 
Chapter 3 proposes authentication methods based on butterfly graph and 
generalized butterfly graph (GBG). In this chapter, we assume a media delivery 
scenario where all packets are treated equally for network transmission. In this 
context, the media quality is proportional to verification probability. First, we propose 
the Butterfly Authentication method connecting packets as a butterfly graph. Analysis 
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and experimental results show that it outperforms existing methods in term of 
verification probability for a given overhead. Further, based on butterfly graph, we 
also propose a more flexible graph structure called Generalized Butterfly Graph 
(GBG), which supports an arbitrary number of packets and arbitrary overhead budget.  
Chapter 4 proposes a Content-aware Optimized Authentication method, by 
taking into consideration varying packet importance. First, we describe a distortion-
overhead optimization framework used to construct an authentication graph, where 
more important packets are allocated with more overhead, hence, have higher 
verification probability. The resulting authentication graph is able to give a 
maximized expected quality (or minimized expected distortion) of the authenticated 
media. Second, based on the distortion-overhead optimization framework, we also 
propose a Content-aware Optimized Authentication method as well as a simplified 
authentication graph with low complexity. Thirdly, we present analysis and 
simulation results to validate the proposed methods. 
Chapter 5 deals with media streaming scenario, where the transmission 
schedule is adaptive to network condition and packet importance. We describe the 
proposed Rate-Distortion-Authentication (R-D-A) Optimized streaming method. The 
packet transmission schedule is computed by accounting for the authentication 
dependency and overhead, besides the coding importance and packet size. Simulation 
results show that the proposed R-D-A method gives higher media quality than 
straightforward concatenation of RaDiO and stream authentication. Specifically, at 
low transmission rate (when bandwidth is lower than source rate), the proposed R-D-
A method is still working, while all other methods fail. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and gives suggestions on future directions. One 
possible direction is to further examine the problem of joint authentication and 
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streaming. In Chapter 4 we have described how to construct authentication graph, 
assuming transmission policy is fixed (i.e., one transmission per packet). In Chapter 5 
we describe how to schedule packet transmission, assuming authentication graph is 
fixed. If the graph construction is jointly done with packet scheduling, we can get 
even better media quality at the receiver. 
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CHAPTER 2 -  OVERVIEW OF STREAM AUTHENTICATION AND 
MEDIA STREAMING TECHNIQUES 
This chapter gives a brief overview of the related work, including existing work on 
stream authentication and media streaming. The former is to assure the receivers that 
the received packets are not modified by unauthorized attacker and they are, indeed, 
from the claimed sender, even in presence of network loss. The latter is to compute 
transmission schedule (when and how to transmit individual packets) to maximize the 
expected media quality at the receiver. In this chapter, Section 2.1 reviews the 
existing stream authentication methods and Section 2.2 reviews the existing media 
streaming methods. 
2.1 STREAM AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES 
A media stream is nothing more than a sequence of media packets and, therefore, 
stream authentication is nothing more than authenticating a sequence of media 
packets. However, media stream has its own properties, making it difficult to 
straightforwardly apply traditional cryptographic methods. First, a media stream 
potentially has a huge number of packets and, therefore, it cannot afford to have too 
high complexity or overhead for authentication. A counter example is to apply one 
digital signature per packet, as illustrated in Figure 1-3(a), which has prohibitively 
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high complexity and high overhead. Second, a media stream tolerates packet loss up 
to a certain level and thereby requires the authentication methods to tolerate packets 
loss as well. In other words, when packet loss occurs in the network, the receiver 
should be able to verify the received packets with high probability. A counter example 
is to apply one digital signature for all packets, as illustrated in Figure 1-3(b), where 
any packet loss will cause all other packets not to be verifiable. Thirdly, a media 
stream should be verified in a continuous manner. In streaming scenarios like VoD, 
VoIP, video conference and video broadcast, it is desirable that the packets can be 
continuously verified as they are delivered to the receiver. The receiver delay 
measures the gap between the time a packet is received and the time it is verified. A 
low receiver delay ensures a smooth media play out at the receiver. It is not 
acceptable that received packets cannot be verified until the last packet is delivered, as 
with the case in Figure 1-3(b). In addition, for live-encoded media like video 
conference and VoIP, it is desirable that the sender could continuously sign and 
transmit the packets generated by the encoder. 
 
Figure 2-1 - Classification of existing stream authentication methods 
 
Figure 2-1 gives various types of stream authentication methods. Initially, the 
MAC-based Stream Authentication method directly applies MAC to authenticate 
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stream packets in one-to-one communication scenarios. A common key is shared by 
the sender and the receiver, where the sender uses the key to generate one MAC per 
packet and the receiver uses the key to verify the received packet. However, in one-to-
many communication scenarios where the common key is shared by all entities, the 
packet can be modified and the associated MAC can be re-computed by any entity, 
and therefore it is not possible verify the integrity of the received packet. To tackle 
this problem, researchers have proposed key-asymmetric variants and time-
asymmetric variants of the MAC-based method. The key-asymmetric methods 
introduce asymmetry in the key material, where the entire key is known to the sender 
and each receiver has only the partial key material. Therefore, the receivers can verify 
the packets but cannot generate valid hashes on behalf of the sender. The 
disadvantage is that the key-asymmetric methods are vulnerable to collusion attack, 
where a set of receivers collaborate to reconstruct the entire key material. The time-
asymmetric methods use time as a source of asymmetry, where the sender keeps 
changing the keys for authentication, and announces a key which is no longer used to 
generate MACs. In other words, by the time a key is announced to all receivers, it is 
no long used by the sender and all packets authenticated with it are already delivered 
to the receivers. However, the time-asymmetric methods raise new security 
vulnerability related to time synchronization disturbance. 
The DSS-based Stream Authentication methods apply digital signature to 
authenticate stream packets. It works in both one-to-one and one-to-many 
communication scenarios, due to the asymmetric keys used by DSS. In addition, it 
simultaneously provides integrity, origin authentication and non-repudiation, while 
the MAC-based method provides integrity only. The disadvantage is that it has very 
high complexity and overhead, because a digital signature has much higher 
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complexity and overhead than a MAC. The lightweight signature methods are 
proposed to reduce the complexity but not the overhead. To reduce both complexity 
and overhead of the DSS-based methods, researchers has proposed to amortize one 
digital signature among a group of packets, using some auxiliary data like hashes, 
recognizing the fact that a hash has much lower complexity and lower overhead than a 
digital signature. Based on the way a signature is amortized, we can classify the 
methods into graph-based methods and erasure-code-based methods. The graph-
based methods connect packet as a directed acyclic graph using hash chaining, while 
the erasure-code-based methods encode the digital signature and packet hash with 
erasure code. However, both methods create inter-dependency between the stream 
packets, i.e., loss of one packet may cause other packets unverifiable. Many methods 
in this category have been proposed to add redundancy to the authentication data in 
order to fight against packet loss. More details can be found in Section 2.1.2. 
2.1.1 MAC-based Stream Authentication 
In a one-to-one communication scenario, MAC can be directly applied to stream 
packets, i.e., one MAC per packet. This is a very efficient solution, due to the 
following reasons: 1) MAC is fast to generate and verify, hence low complexity; 2) 
MAC is small in size, hence low overhead; 3) Each packet individually verifiable, 
hence high robustness against loss; 4) A received packet can be verified instantly, 
hence lower receiver delay. 
MAC, however, is not suitable for one-to-many communication scenarios, due 
to the symmetric key used. A naïve solution is to have a separate key between the 
sender and each receiver, which obviously have many disadvantages like high 
complexity and high overhead. The sender has to compute one MAC for each 
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receiver, using the key shared with that receiver. In order to use MAC in one-to-many 
scenario, it is desirable to have some asymmetric mechanism which allows receivers 
to verify received data without being able to generate valid authentication on behalf of 
the sender. There are some existing methods to use MAC in one-to-many scenarios, 
which can be classified into two categories: key-asymmetric methods [51][55][56] 
[57][58][59][60][61] and time-asymmetric methods [62][63][64][33][65][66][67][68]. 
The key-asymmetric methods introduce asymmetry in the key material used to 
authenticate data. In particular, the entire key material is known to the sender, and 
only partial key material is known to a receiver. As such, the receivers can verify the 
received packets but cannot generate valid MAC on behalf of the sender. For 
example, in the method proposed by Canetti, et al [55], the sender holds a set of l keys 
and attaches to each packet l MACs – each MAC computed with a different key. Each 
receiver holds a subset of the l keys and verifies the MAC according to the key it 
holds. Appropriate choice of subsets ensures that with high probability no coalition of 
up of w colluding bad receivers know all the keys held by a good receiver, where w is 
an input parameter. However, since the receivers hold partial key material, the key-
asymmetric methods are vulnerable to collusion attack, where a set of receivers 
collaborate to reconstruct the key material used by the sender. 
The time-asymmetric methods use time as a source of asymmetry. For 
example, in Time Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [33], the 
receivers are synchronized with the sender’s clock and are instructed when to accept a 
specific key as being used to verify received packets. A key is disclosed to the 
receivers only after the sender finishes using it to generate MACs. In other words, by 
the time a key is disclosed, it is no longer used by the sender to generate MACs. 
Therefore, an attacker is unable to forge a message on half of the senders. The sender 
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must be very careful about the gap from the time a key is last used for signing to the 
time the same key is disclosed. If the gap is not sufficiently large, it is possible that a 
packet is still making its way to the receivers when the key is disclosed, and therefore 
gives an attacker the opportunity to forge the packet. Note that the time-asymmetric 
methods raises new security vulnerability related to time synchronization disturbance. 
Note that neither key-asymmetric methods nor time-asymmetric methods 
provide non-repudiation, due to its nature of symmetric key. 
2.1.2 DSS-based Stream Authentication 
DSS is mature solution for data authentication to simultaneously provide integrity, 
origin authentication and non-repudiation. Since DSS uses asymmetric key pair, it 
works in both one-to-one and one-to-many communication scenarios. At any time, the 
private key, which is used to generate the signature, is known to the sender only. The 
receivers know the public key only, and therefore they can verify received packets but 
cannot generate a valid signature on half of the sender. However, DSS has much 
higher complexity than MAC. According to a benchmarking result [69], a RSA 1024 
signature operation takes 6430000 cycles, a RSA 1024 verification operation takes 
290000 cycles, and a keyed-hash based message authentication code (or HMAC) has 
the complexity of 26.4 cycles per byte. That is, for a given packet of 200 bytes, the 
time required by a RSA 1024 signature operation is 1217 times of that required by a 
HMAC operation. And similarly, the time required by a RSA 1024 verification 
operation is 55 times of that required by a HMAC operation. In addition, DSS also 
has much higher overhead than MAC. For example, a RSA signature is at least 128 
bytes while a HMAC is only around 20 bytes. 
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Chapter 1 describes two simple solutions of using DSS for authenticating 
stream packets, as illustrated in Figure 1-3. The first solution has very high overhead, 
high complexity and high verification probability (or robustness), while the second 
one has very low overhead, low complexity and low verification probability. It is 
desirable to have a practical solution with reasonable overhead and complexity, where 
received packets are verifiable with reasonably high probability. Towards this goal, 
there are two possible approaches: one approach is to propose a lightweight signature 
with lower complexity and overhead; the other approach is to amortize one digital 
signature among a group of packets. 
There exists a few lightweight signature methods [29][31][32][65]. Gennaro 
and Rohatgi [31] propose using a one-time signature and one-time public key to 
authenticate each packet. Although one-time signature has lower complexity, it still 
has high overhead, which is in the order of several hundred bytes per signature. Later 
on, Rohatgi [32] proposed using a combination of k-time signatures and certificates 
for the k-time public keys (created with a regular signature scheme) to authenticate 
packets. Despite its improvement over the one-time signature scheme, this method 
still requires an overhead of the order of several hundred bytes. Wong and Lam [29] 
proposed extensions to the Feige-Fiat-Shamir digital signature scheme, also known as 
eFFS, to speed up both the signature generation and verification operations. However, 
the public key and private key in eFFS are huge in size. Perrig [65] proposes another 
one-time signature scheme called BiBa, with significantly faster signature and 
verification operations. However, BiBa’s security is dependent on the time 
synchronization between the sender and the receivers. The authentication rate 
(number of packet verified per unit time) is limited by the maximum allowable time 
synchronization error. A BiBa signature is still very large, around 100-200 bytes and 
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the public key is of the order of 10KB, which is exacerbated by the fact that the public 
key has to be transmitted at regular intervals. 
The other approach is to amortize one digital signature among a group of 
packets, using some auxiliary data like hashes of packets, recognizing the fact that the 
digital signature has much higher complexity and overhead than hash. According to 
[69], a RSA 1024 signature operation has a complexity that is 3457 times more than a 
MD-5 hash operation and a RSA 1024 verification operation has a complexity that is 
155 times more than a MD-5 hash operation. Based on the way a signature is 
amortized, existing DSS-based methods can be further classified into two categories: 
Erasure-code-based and graph-based methods, which are explained in more details in 
Section 2.1.2.1 and Section 2.1.2.2 respectively. Both types of methods try to add 
redundancy to the authentication data (including signature and hashes), in order to 
fight against packet loss. 
2.1.2.1 Erasure-code-based Stream Authentication 
Erasure-code-based methods apply erasure codes to the authentication information 
(including hash and digital signature) to fight against packet loss. The Signature 
Amortization based on IDA algorithm (SAIDA) [26][27] proposes to use Information 
Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) [37], as illustrated in Figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-2 – Illustration of Erasure-code-based stream authentication 
 
The Erasure-code-based authentication is applied in the following steps: 
• A stream of packets is first divided into blocks. Suppose each block has N packets, 
namely, P0, P1… PN-1. The steps below are performed on every group. 
• A hash value H(Pi) , where i=0,1…,N-1, is computed for each packet using one-
way hash function like SHA-1 or MD-5. The concatenation of all hash values is 
indicated using F=H(P0)||H(P1)||…||H(PN-1), where || indicates concatenation 
operation. 
• IDA erasure coding is applied to F, generating N segments, namely, 
0 1 1, ,..., NF F F −′ ′ ′ . Out of the N segments, any m segments can be decoded to recover 
the original bit string F, where m is a pre-determined parameter of erasure coding. 
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• A digital signature S is generated from the hash of F using a digital signature 
scheme, i.e., S=SIGN(H(F)), where SIGN(.) represents digital signing operation. 
• The same IDA erasure coding is applied to S, generating N segments, namely, 
0 1 1, ,..., NS S S −′ ′ ′ . Similarly, any m out of the N segments can be decoded to recover 
the original digital signature S. 
• The hash segment iF ′and signature segment iS ′ are appended to packet Pi, where 
0≤i<N. 
After signing, the packets are transmitted to the receiver, where the signature S 
and hash string F are recovered as long as at least m packets are received out of N 
packets in a group. With S and F recovered, the receiver is able to verify all received 
packets within the group.  
The trade-off between verification probability and overhead is governed by the 
parameter m, which is the minimum number of packets required for recovering the 
authentication information. A smaller value of m implies higher overhead and high 
verification probability, and vice versa. 
Pannetrat and Molva [28] also proposed a similar method that has three 
variants: Unbuffered Sender Scheme, Double Buffered Scheme and Single Buffered 
Scheme. The Unbuffered Sender Scheme piggybacks the hash segments and signature 
segments of current block onto the packets of the next block. It has no sender delay 
because a packet can be sent out once its hash value is computed. The receiver delay, 
however, is equivalent to two blocks of packets, as the received packet cannot be 
verified until sufficient packets in the next block are received. On the contrary, the 
Double Buffered Scheme piggybacks the hash segments and signature segments of 
current block onto the packets in previous block. It has a sender delay equivalent to 
two blocks and no receiver delay. The Single Buffered Scheme piggybacks the hash 
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segments and signature segments onto the packets in same block. In this case, both 
sender delay and receiver delay are equivalent to one block of packets. 
Although Erasure-code-based methods are efficient in trading off verification 
probability and overhead, it has high complexity because erasure coding and decoding 
are expensive operations. This is especially a concern where the sender or the 
receivers are small devices like PDA or cell phone. 
2.1.2.2 Graph-based Stream Authentication 
Gennaro and Rohatgi [31] propose a Simple Hash Chain for stream 
authentication, as illustrated in Figure 2-3. A digital signature is amortized by forming 
a hash chain. Starting from the last packet, each packet has its hash appended to a 
previous packet and the first packet is signed using a digital signature. This method 
has very low overhead, only around one hash per packet on average, but it also has 
very low verification probability, as any packet loss will break the chain and all 
subsequent packets are not verifiable. It has a sender delay up to N packets and no 
receiver delay. 
 
Figure 2-3 – Simple Hash Chain 
 
Perrig, et al propose the Efficient Multi-Chained Stream Signature (EMSS) 
[33], which is basically an extension to the Simple Hash Chain method [31]. The 
basic idea is to add more redundant paths to the hash chain such that even in the 
presence of packet loss, the received packets still have a path to the signature packet 
with high probability. As illustrated in Figure 2-4, each packet has its hash appended 
to m (where m=2 in this example) packets that are randomly selected from the 
immediately following L packets (where m < L), and the last packet is signed. 
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Compared to Simple Hash Chain, EMSS has higher overhead and also higher 
verification probability. Further, since PSIGN is located at the end of the chain and all 
edges are pointing forward, EMSS has no sender delay and the receiver delay is up to 
N packets. 
 
Figure 2-4 – Efficient Multi-Chained Stream Signature (EMSS) 
 
Golle and Modadugu [59] propose another method called Augmented Chain, 
which is a systematic method of putting edges in strategic locations so that the chain 
can resist a burst loss. Figure 2-5 shows an example of an augmented chain Ca,p with 
a=2 and p=5. There are two types of edges in Augmented Chain, global edges and 
local edges. The global edges connect the packets whose indices are multiple of p, 
while the local edges connect the packets in their own locality.  It can survive a burst 
loss of up to p(a-1) packets in length. The last packet is the signature packet. The 
overhead is 2 hashes per packet on average. The sender delay is equivalent to p 
packets and the receiver is equivalent to N packets. 
 
Figure 2-5 – Augmented Chain (a=2 and p=5) 
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Miner and Staddon [35] propose the Piggybacking method similar to 
Augmented Chain to resist multiple burst losses. In the Piggybacking scheme, N 
packets are partitioned into r equal-size priority classes. The signature packet is the 
first packet in the highest priority class. It is assumed that the packets in the highest 
priority class are spaced evenly throughout the block so that two consecutive packets 
of the highest priority class are located exactly r packets apart. The Piggybacking 
method is designed in such a way that packets in the i-th priority class can tolerate 
burst loss of size at most kir, where ki is a parameter dependent on the configuration of 
the hash chains. 
Wong and Lam propose Tree Authentication method [29] that employs 
Merkle’s authentication trees [30]. Figure 2-6 shows a binary authentication tree, 
where a rectangle represents a packet and a cycle represents a hash value computed 
from the underlying packet or hash values. A digital signature is generated from the 
root of the tree. Each packet carries the digital signature and the hash values in the 
sibling nodes along its path to the root node. Its advantage is that each packet is 
individually verifiable, i.e., the verification probability is 1. Given N packets, each 
packet carries one signature and log2N hash values, leading to a very high overhead. It 
has no receiver delay and the sender delay is equivalent to N packets. 
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Figure 2-6 – Tree Authentication (degree = 2) 
2.2 OPTIMIZED MEDIA STREAMING TECHNIQUES 
Media streaming is a technique used to deliver media data (which is usually 
compressed) to a receiver in real-time over a network. It allows the media data to be 
transmitted in a continuous stream and played as it arrives. That is, the receiver does 
not have to wait to download the entire media data before seeing the video and 
hearing the sound. With advances in media compression and network technologies, 
media streaming techniques are becoming increasingly more important, which is 
evident in emerging commercial applications like IPTV, Video-on-Demand, VoIP, 
Video conference, and so on. 
There exist a very diverse range of media streaming applications, with very 
different operation conditions and properties. For example, media streaming can be 
for one-to-one or one-to-many (multicast or broadcast) communication scenarios, the 
media may be pre-encoded (e.g., Video-on-Demand) or encoded in real-time (e.g., 
VoIP and video conference), the channel may be static or dynamic depending on 
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whether or not the channel characteristics (e.g., bandwidth, delay and loss rate) 
change over time, the channel may support QoS or just best-effort transmission. The 
above conditions impose different technical challenges and different user 
requirements for media streaming techniques. 
Since the raw media data is usually huge in size and occupies large storage 
space and bandwidth, it is often compressed before being transmitted over a network. 
There exist various standards (JPEG, JPEG 2000, H.261/3/4, MPEG-1/2/4) or 
proprietary (RealNetworks [82] and Microsoft Windows Media [83]) media 
compression techniques. While the compression significantly reduces the size of 
media data (hence saving storage space and bandwidth), it also makes the streaming 
media sensitive to network loss. In the compressed domain, some packets are very 
important and the loss of such important packets will cause drastic negative impact on 
media quality. For example, in the GOP structure shown in Figure 2-7, a P-frame 
packet depends on the previous I/P-frame packet, and the B-frame packet depends on 
both previous and next I/P-frame packets for decoding. In this case, the loss of an I-
frame causes all frames not to be decodable within the GOP, while the loss of a B-
frame does not affect other frames at all. Some existing methods prioritize the media 
packets and apply differentiated treatment to the packets using DiffServ [70][71][72], 
Forward Error Control (FEC) [73][74][75] and Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) 
[76][77][78][78]. 
Furthermore, when network bandwidth is a scarce resource and the source rate 
is higher than the channel rate, the sender may need to actively prune the media data 
in order to avoid congestion in the network. Based on the packets’ priority, the sender 
carefully selects which packets to transmit and how to transmit, in order get optimal 
quality at the receiver. Scalable media compression techniques like JPEG 2000 [2] 
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and Scalable Video Coding (SVC) [9] are designed to enable simple transcoding with 
lower complexity. The lower-priority packets are discarded to make the resulting 
media data match the channel rate. 
 
Figure 2-7 – Example of predication dependency between frames in a GOP 
 
A recent advance in media streaming is called Rate-Distortion Optimized 
(RaDiO) streaming [38], which computes packet transmission schedule to maximize 
media quality at the receiver, given the knowledge of packets’ importance and 
network conditions. In other words, the goal of RaDiO is to find an optimal 
transmission schedule that minimizes the expected media distortion for a given 
constraint on transmission cost, or conversely, minimizes the transmission cost for a 
given media distortion. 
With RaDiO, each packet is associated with 3 attributes: size B, deadline T 
and distortion increment ∆d. If a packet is delivered and decoded by its deadline T, 
the total distortion will be reduced by ∆d. A packet delivered after its deadline is 
discarded or therefore is equivalent to loss. The distortion model is assumed to be 
additive across the lost packets, i.e., the total distortion caused by multiple lost 
packets is simply the sum of their distortion increments. When the lost packets are 
sufficiently far apart, the additive model is quite accurate. However, in the case of 
bursty loss, the additive model is no longer accurate, as detailed in [80]. In the rest of 
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this thesis, we assume an additive distortion model because of its simplicity and lower 
complexity. 
The transmission policy for a single packet Pn is represented by nπ , which 
varies with the underlying network. For instance, in a network with DiffServ services 
[81], the policy nπ is simply the forwarding service (Guaranteed Service, Assured 
Forwarding, or Best-Effort) chosen to transmit packet Pn; when FEC is used to protect 
packet from loss, the policy nπ refers to the amount of redundancy added to packet Pn; 
when ARQ is used to re-transmit lost packet, the policy nπ refers to the number of (re-
)transmissions for packet Pn. Associated with the policy nπ are a cost per byte ( )nρ π  
for transmitting Pn and an error probability ( )nε π of not delivering the packet by its 
deadline Tn. To transmit a single packet Pn, the optimal performance can be achieved 
by selecting the transmission policy nπ to minimize the Lagrangian in Eq(2.1) where 
nλ is positive value. 
 ( ) ( )n n nε π λ ρ π+  (2.1) 
The transmission policy for N packets is represented by a policy 
vector [ ]0 1 1, ,... ,...n Nπ π π π π −= , where nπ is the transmission policy of packet Pn. The 
total expected transmission cost is the sum of the transmission cost of all N packets, as 
in Eq(2.2). In turn, the transmission cost for a packet Pn is the cost per byte ( )nρ π  
times the packet size Bn. The term ( )R π represents the total expected cost for 
transmitting all N packets using policyπ . 





R Bπ ρ π−
=
=∑  (2.2) 
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The total expected distortion for N packets is more complicated to express. It 
is assumed that a packet Pn may depend on some other packets for decoding. For 
example in Figure 2-7, P6 depends on I0 and P3; B5 depends on I0, P3 and P6. We use 
( )nPφ to represent the set of packets needed by packet Pn for decoding. For easy 
explanation, Pn is also included in ( )nPφ , i.e., ( )n nP Pφ∈ . Therefore, the probability 










−∏ . At the receiver 
side, if a packet is delivered and decoded before its deadline, the total distortion is 
reduced by ndΔ ; otherwise, the distortion is not reduced. Assuming that the total 
distortion when no packet is received is D0 and distortion is additive, the expected 
distortion of the reconstructed media at the receiver can be expressed with Eq(2.3). 
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With Eq(2.2) and Eq(2.3) for the expected transmission cost and expected 
distortion, the policy vector π can be optimized to minimize the expected distortion 
subject to a constraint on the expected transmission cost. The problem can be solved 
by finding the policy vector π that minimizes the expected Lagrangian in Eq(2.4), for 
a given 0λ > . 
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⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= + Δ − − +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∏  (2.4) 
 However, it is not an easy problem to minimize the expected Lagrangian in 
Eq(2.4). The probability that a packet Pn is decodable depends on not only its own 
policy nπ but also the policy of other packets in ( )nPφ . As such, the expected 
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distortion cannot be split into a sum of terms, each depending on only a single 
policy nπ , and the minimization problem in Eq(2.4) is very complicated. 
An iterative descent algorithm is proposed to solve the minimization problem. 
The objective function ( )J π  minimizes one policy variable at a time, keeping the 
other variables constant. This is repeated until the objective function converges. At 
each step, the minimization problem is actually transformed into an error-cost 
minimization problem for a single packet similar to Eq(2.1). For instance, for packet 
Pn, its optimized policy *nπ can be searched using Eq(2.5), where nS is the sensitivity 
factor of packet Pn, which is the amount by which the total expected distortion will 
increase if the packet Pn cannot be received by its deadline, given the current 
transmission policies for all other packets. 







λπ ε π ρ π= +  (2.5) 
Note that RaDiO achieves very good performance at the price of increased 
computational complexity. Searching for an optimized transmission policy is 
computationally expensive, due to the coding dependency among the packets. The 
iterative descent algorithm has to run for many iterations before the objective function 
converges. Therefore, RaDiO is inappropriate for on-line optimized video streaming. 
Chakareski, et al [39][40] propose a low-complexity rate-distortion optimized 
streaming method. Specifically, an R-D hint track (RDHT) is generated when media 
is encoded, which contains side information to facilitate high quality streaming with 
low complexity. 
The RaDiO framework is also extended in more advanced streaming 
scenarios, such as streaming over multiple paths [41][42], distributed streaming from 
multiple servers [43][44], streaming via network edge [45][46], streaming with 
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multiple deadlines [47], streaming with rich acknowledges [48] and with improved 
rate and distortion model[49][50]. 
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CHAPTER 3 -  STREAM AUTHENTICATION BASED ON BUTTERFLY 
GRAPH 
Graph-based stream authentication amortizes a digital signature among a group of N 
packets, by connecting them as a DAG. Since only one signature is generated for all N 
packets, a graph-based method has much lower complexity and overhead. However, it 
also introduces dependency among the packets, i.e., loss of one packet may cause 
some other packets not to be verifiable, and thereby equivalent to a loss. At the 
receiver, lost packets are removed from the graph and a received packet is verifiable 
only if it has at least a path to the signature packet. That is to say, each received 
packet is verifiable with a probability. For instance, with Simple Hash Chain [31], if a 
packet is lost, all subsequent packets have no path to the signature packet and 
therefore are not verifiable. In order to increase the verification probability, more 
redundant paths have to be added such that a received packet has a path to the 
signature packet with higher probability. EMSS [33], Augmented Chain [34] and 
Piggyback [35] follow this direction of adding redundant paths. 
While adding redundant paths increases the verification probability, it also 
increases the overhead, because each edge in the graph corresponds to the overhead of 
one hash value. Therefore, a trade-off exists between the overhead and verification 
probability. It is desirable to have an optimal balance point such that the verification 
probability is maximized for a given overhead, or conversely the overhead is 
 54 
minimized for a given verification probability. Therefore, the key problem is how to 
construct an authentication graph that is able to achieve the optimal balance. 
Butterfly graph is commonly used in the design of communication networks 
for parallel and distributed systems, due to the following properties: 1) Good fault-
tolerance: A node has a high probability of being connected in the presence of faulty 
nodes in the graph; 2) The maximum fan-in and fan-out degree is 2, i.e., a node has up 
to 2 incoming edges and up to 2 outgoing edges. For graph-based stream 
authentication, the fault-tolerance of the graph is equivalent to verification 
probability, and the fan-in and fan-out degrees are equivalent to overhead. This 
naturally motivates us to apply butterfly graph for stream authentication, known as 
Butterfly Authentication. We also experimentally demonstrate that the Butterfly 
Authentication method has higher verification probability than existing methods when 
the overhead is fixed at around 2 hashes per packet. More details of Butterfly 
Authentication can be found in Section 3.1. 
Nevertheless, Butterfly Authentication has its own limitations: (1) the total 
number of packets is not flexible; (2) fixed overhead due to its fixed topology; (3) the 
signature packet size grows with the total number of packets. If the number of packets 
is large, the signature packet may be bigger than the network MTU and, therefore, is 
fragmented for transmission, which increases its loss probability and negatively 
impacts verification probability of all other packets in the graph. To overcome the 
abovementioned limitations, we propose the Generalized Butterfly Graph (GBG) in 
Section 3.2. The GBG graph supports an arbitrary number of packets and arbitrary 
overhead. Further, with the GBG graph the signature packet can be confined within 
one MTU, which implies that it does not have to be fragmented for transmission. The 
GBG graph supports a wide range of possible authentication graphs, and the problem 
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of finding the best authentication graph for a given situation corresponds to a graph 
design problem. Simulation results demonstrate that the GBG authentication method 
outperform the other graph-based methods. 
3.1 BUTTERFLY AUTHENTICATION 
Stream packets are divided into groups of N packets, and only one signature is 
generated for each group. The N packets and the extra signature packet are connected 
as a butterfly graph, assuming N=NR(log2NR+1) and NR is the number of rows in the 
butterfly graph. The Butterfly authentication graph is defined as follows: 
Definition: A butterfly authentication graph is a DAG containing one signature 
packet PSIGN and N= NR(log2NR+1) packets. The N data packets are arranged into a 
matrix with NR rows and NC columns, where N= NRNC and NC=log2NR+1. In the 
original sequence, the n-th packet is represented by Pn, where 0≤n<N. In the butterfly 
graph, the packet Pn is also represented with Pc,r, where n=cNR+r, 0≤c<NC and 
0≤r<NR. The first subscript c is the column index while the second subscript r is the 
row index. In the butterfly graph, there is an edge from packet ,c rP  to packet ,c rP ′ ′ if 
either of the following conditions is satisfied: 
1. 1c c and r r′ ′= + =  
2. 1c c′= +  and r′ is different from r only at c′ -th most significant bit. 
In addition, each packet in the first column has an edge to the signature packet, 
i.e., the signature packet PSIGN contains the hashes of all packets in the first column 
and a digital signature generated from the hashes. Recall that an edge from packet A 
to packet B is realized by appending A’s hash to B. 
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Figure 3-1 – An example butterfly authentication graph 
 
Figure 3-1 gives an example of the butterfly authentication graph, with 4 
columns and 8 rows. The signature packet PSIGN contains the signature and hashes of 
all packets in the first column. All packets in column 0 to NC-1 containing two hashes, 
corresponding to two incoming edges, and the packets in the last column do not have 
any hash. Assuming that the hash size is h bytes and the signature size is g bytes, the 
average overhead per packet Oavg can be expressed with Eq (3.1). 
 22 , log 1C R
C
g hh where N N
N N
+ − = +  (3.1) 
The computational complexity is also very low, including 1 signature 
operation and N hashing operations at the sender. At the receiver, the complexity is 1 
verification operation and N hashing operations. 
Since the signature packet PSIGN carries the digital signature, loss of PSIGN will 
cause all other packets not verifiable. Thus, the signature packet has to be delivered 
using mechanisms like multiple repeated transmissions, ARQ or FEC. For the 
moment, we assume that PSIGN is always received. The packet loss probability ε 
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follows an identical and independent distribution, i.e., random packet loss. Since a 
packet ,c rP  is connected to 1,c rP −  and 1,c rP ′− (where r and r′ differ at (c-1)-th most 
significant bit), ,c rP is verifiable if either 1,c rP − or 1,c rP ′−  is verifiable and received. 
Further, the butterfly graph has a nice “independency property”, i.e., a packet is 
connected to two packets that are independent of each other for verification. This 
property maximizes the packet’s verification probability. Therefore, the verification 
probability ,c rV can be expressed with Eq (3.2). 
 , 2
1, 1, 1, 1,
1 0
0c r c r c r c r c r
when c
V
V V V V when cε ε ε′ ′− − − −
=⎧= ⎨ + − >⎩
 (3.2) 
From Eq(3.2), we can see that the verification probability is initially 1 for 
packets in the first column and is decreasing as we go from the first column to the last 
column. This is because the packets in a later column are further away from the 
signature packet and they have more dependency than the packets in earlier column. 
Nevertheless, the decreasing trend is slowed down by the factor that a packet in later 
column has more redundant paths to the signature packet. For example, a packet in the 
second column has 2 alternative paths to the signature packets PSIGN and each path has 
a distance of 2 edges, while a packet in the third column has 4 alternative paths to 
PSIGN and each path has a distance of 3 edges. As a result, the verification probability 
has a noticeable drop-off for the first few columns only, and thereafter remains 
constant, as illustrated in Figure 3-2. Note that all packets in the same column have 
the same verification probability. 
Regarding the burst packet loss, the butterfly authentication method is able to 
resist up to NR/2c+1 consecutive packet losses at column c, where 0≤c<NC. In the 
example graph depicted in Figure 3-1, it can resist a burst loss of up to 4 packets and 
2 packets in column 0 and column 1, respectively. 
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Note that the Butterfly Authentication method also has a sender delay 
equivalent to N packets, because the sender has to compute the hashes and the 
signature before sending the first packet. For live-encoded media, the long sender 
delay may not be acceptable. However, for pre-encoded media, sender delay is not 
important as the authentication can be done off-line. Since the signature packet is 
located at the beginning and all edges point backward, the Butterfly Authentication 
method does not have any receiver delay, i.e., a packet can be verified immediately 
after it is received. Therefore, the receiver does not have to maintain a buffer to store 
the packets that have been received but not yet verified. The above analysis of 
receiver delay is based on the assumption that packets are delivered in the same order 
as they are transmitted by the sender. However, if the packets are delivered out-of-
order, it is possible that a received packet is not immediately verifiable, and therefore 
a buffer is required to temporarily store this packet until it becomes verifiable. The 
buffer size varies with the networks. 
 
Figure 3-2 – Verification probability at different columns of a butterfly graph (ε=0.2) 
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3.1.1 Performance Evaluation 
In this section, we compare the Butterfly Authentication method with other existing 
methods using the evaluation criteria defined in Section 1.2.5. The comparison is 
summarized in Table 3-1. The results are obtained with the following settings and 
assumptions: 
 A digital signature is amortized by a group of N packets, hash size is h 
bytes and signature size is g bytes.  
 The Tree-Authentication in [29] has a degree of 2, i.e., each internal node 
has two children nodes. 
 For EMSS [33], each packet has l outgoing edges connecting to the 
packets that are randomly selected from previous L packets. 
 For Augmented Chain [34], the term a is the maximum distance between 
two nodes that are connected with a global edge, and p is the size of packet 
buffer at the sender. 
 For Butterfly Authentication, it is assumed that N=NR(log2NR+1). 
Table 3-1 – Comparison of various graph-based authentication methods 













g+hlog2N N 1 very high 




g/N+h N 1 Very low 
EMSS [33] 1 Signature 
N hashing 





g/N+2h p N High 
Butterfly 1 Signature g/N+2h- N 1 High 
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Authentication N hashing h/(log2NR+1) 
 
The methods listed in Table 3-1 have roughly the same complexity, including 
1 signature/verification operation and N hashing operations. The only exception is the 
Tree-Authentication method [29], which has to perform N-1 extra hashing operations 
than the other methods. 
In terms of overhead, the Tree-Authentication method [29] and Simple Hash 
Chain [31] are two extreme cases, where the former has very high overhead (each 
packet carries a signature and log2N hashes) and the latter has very low overhead (the 
first packet carries a signature and all other packets carry a single hash). EMSS [33] 
has variable overhead, and Augmented Chain [34] has around 2 hashes per packets. 
The Butterfly Authentication method has overhead close to Augmented Chain. 
The Tree-Authentication [29], Simple Hash Chain [31] and the proposed 
Butterfly Authentication have a sender delay equivalent to N packets and a receiver 
delay equivalent to 1 packet. Therefore, the sender has to maintain a buffer of N 
packets to store the packets that are generated by a media encoder but not yet ready 
for transmission. For pre-encoded media, the authentication process can be done 
offline at the sender side, and hence sender delay is not a problem. The EMSS [33] 
and Augmented Chain [34] have higher receiver delay of N packets, which implies 
that the receiver has to maintain a big buffer to store the packets that have been 
received but not yet verified. In addition, the high receiver delay might negatively 
impact the smoothness of media play out. 
To evaluate the performance of the Butterfly Authentication method, we 
conducted simulations using the following settings: 1) N=1024; 2) h=16 bytes; 3) 
g=128 bytes; and 4) the signature packet is always received; (5) Packet loss rate ε 
ranges from 0 to 0.5 [88]. In the simulation experiment, EMSS and Augmented Chain 
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are implemented with their optimal setting. For instance, in the EMSS graph, the 
distance of two endpoints of an edge is uniformly distributed in the interval [1, 128]. 
For the Augmented Chain, a=15 and p=7, which are selected by the original authors 
in [34]. Figure 3-3 shows the verification probability at different overheads, by fixing 
packet loss rate at 0.3. We can see that the Butterfly Authentication method 
outperforms the other methods under the same overhead. 
 
Figure 3-3 – Verification probability at various overheads (Packet loss rate = 0.3) 
 
Figure 3-4 shows the verification probability at various packet loss rates 
(overhead is fixed at 32 bytes per packet), which demonstrates that the Butterfly 
Authentication method outperforms the other methods at all loss rates. In addition, the 
performance gap between Butterfly Authentication and the other methods grows with 
the packet loss rates. 
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Figure 3-4 – Verification probability at various packet loss rates (Overhead is 32 bytes 
per packet) 
3.2 GENERALIZED BUTTERFLY GRAPH AUTHENTICATION 
Although the Butterfly Authentication method outperforms the existing methods, it 
has three limitations. First, the total number of packets is not flexible, i.e., 
N=NR(log2NR+1), where NR is the number rows in the butterfly graph. Second, the 
overhead is fixed at around 2 hashes per packet. In certain situations, we may want to 
have higher verification probability at the expense of higher overhead, which cannot 
be supported by the Butterfly Authentication method. Thirdly, the signature packet 
grows with N, as it contains the hashes of all packets in the first column. For large N 
the signature packet may be larger than the network MTU and therefore has to be 
fragmented into several datagrams for network transmission. The signature packet is 
considered lost if any of its datagrams is lost, which increases its loss probability and 
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negatively impacts all the packets. Recall that loss of signature packet causes all 
packets not to be verifiable in the graph. 
In this section, we try to preserve the Butterfly graph’s valuable fault-tolerance 
property, while extending it to overcome the above 3 limitations, and refer to this 
framework as the Generalized Butterfly Graph (GBG). The GBG framework supports 
a wide range of possible authentication graphs, and the problem of finding the best 
authentication graph for a given situation corresponds to a graph design problem. The 
input parameters include the total number of packets N, the packet loss rate ε, and the 
overhead budget RO. The output parameters include the number of rows and columns 
(NR & NC), edge placement, and number of transmissions M of the signature packet. 
The signature packet may be transmitted multiple times to reduce the probability of 
loss. RO accounts for the single or multiple transmissions of the signature packet and 
overhead data corresponding to edges in the graph. The evaluation metric is 
verification probability. In addition, we also propose a new evaluation metric called 
the Loss-Amplification-Factor (LAF), defined as the ratio of effective loss rate over 
packet loss rate. The effective loss rate accounts for both lost packets and packets 
which are received but unverifiable, i.e., ε+(1- ε)(1-V), where ε is packet loss rate and 
V is the verification percentage. For example, a value of 1.5 means the authentication 
technique causes the effective loss rate to be 50% higher than that when no 
authentication is used.  Ideally, the LAF would equal 1, i.e., all received packets are 
verified. The closer the LAF for an authentication technique is to 1, the greater the 
robustness is against network losses. 
In the subsequent sections, we first analyze the butterfly authentication graph 
to find a cost-effective edge placement strategy given an overhead budget RO, as 
detailed in Section 3.2.1. After that we examine in Section 3.2.2 how to relax the 
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butterfly structure to support an arbitrary number of packets and to confine the 
signature packet within an MTU. Based on this analysis, we propose in Section 3.2.3 
the GBG framework and describe how to design an authentication graph for a given 
situation. In Section 3.2.4 we evaluate the proposed GBG authentication method 
against existing methods. 
3.2.1 Analysis of Butterfly: Edge Placement 
The butterfly graph has a fixed topology and therefore fixed overhead. This section 
studies the problem of how to place the edges in the graph given an arbitrary overhead 
budget RO.  To gain more insight into this problem, we implement two greedy 
algorithms to progressively add edges (one at a time) to the authentication graph, 
starting from the initial state depicted in Figure 3-5. Initially, the packets are arranged 
into the same matrix as in a butterfly and each packet is connected to only one packet 
in the previous column. Then, at every step, the greedy algorithm computes the 
overall verification probability for all possible new edges and adds the edge that 
provides the largest gain. When there are multiple candidate edges with the same 
gain, it randomly picks one such candidate. The first greedy algorithm, referred to as 
unconstrained greedy, allows an edge from one packet to any packet in the previous 
column. The second algorithm, referred to as constrained greedy, allows only the 
edges that appear in the original Butterfly. Figure 3-6 gives one example graph after 
24 edges are added by unconstrained greedy algorithm, and Figure 3-1 gives the graph 
after 24 edges are added by constrained greedy algorithm. 
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Figure 3-5 – Initial state of greedy algorithms (with 32 packets) 
 
 
Figure 3-6 – A resulting graph after 24 edges are added by greedy algorithm (without 
butterfly constraint) 
 
Figure 3-7 compares the LAF of the two greedy algorithms with 32 packets 
(NR=8 and NC=4), where 24 extra edges are progressively added, starting from the 
initial state shown in Figure 3-5. One observation is that after 24 edges are added, 
each packet (except the packet in the first column) has exactly 2 outgoing edges with 
both unconstrained and constrained greedy algorithms. Another observation is that a 
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packet’s verification probability is maximized if it is connected to two packets that are 
independent of each other for verification (i.e., independence property, as observed 
from the butterfly graph). The unconstrained greedy algorithm has lower LAF when 
the number of added edge α≤15, while the constrained greedy algorithm has slightly 
lower LAF when α>15. When α is small, the unconstrained greedy algorithm allows 
more than 2 packets to be connected to a packet with higher verification probability, 
without violating the independence property. When α is large, it is no longer possible 
for the unconstrained greedy algorithm to find edges that satisfy the independence 
property, while the constrained greedy algorithm can still find such edges. Therefore, 
the butterfly-constraint greedy algorithm produces slightly worse performance in the 
middle and slightly better performance at the end. We will apply this butterfly 
constraint for edge placement when overhead budget is not more than 2 hashes per 
packet. 
We also observe that the greedy algorithm adds the edges in middle column 
first, and then progressively adds to the outer columns. In summary, when the given 
overhead budget is less than 2 edges per packet, the edges placement process should 
follow the butterfly constraint and the order of placement should be from middle 
column to outer columns. 
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Figure 3-7 – LAF of graphs built with unconstrained and constrained greedy algorithm 
 
The above experiment demonstrates that the butterfly graph provides the best 
performance when the overhead budget is exactly 2 hashes per packet (i.e., the same 
overhead to butterfly authentication). Next, we examine the problem of finding the 
best edge placement order beyond 2 edges per packet. In a butterfly graph, adding one 
edge originating from a packet Pc,r has two benefits: one is the increased verification 
probability of Pc,r itself,  and the other is the increased verification probability of its 
dependent packets. For example, in Figure 3-1, if an edge is added from packet P1,0 to 
P0,1, the first benefit is the increased verification probability of P1,0 and the second 
benefit is the increased verification probability of P2,0, P2,2, P3,0, P3,1, P3,2 and P3,3.  
Figure 3-8 shows the increment of verification probability of Pc,r if an edge 
originating from Pc,r is added to the butterfly graph. We can see that the increment 
grows with the column index, i.e., the higher the column index c, the greater the 
increment is. However, the increment converges when the column index c is greater 
than 4. The reason is that the packets in earlier columns already have very high 
verification probability and adding one more edge does not help much. 
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Figure 3-8 – Increment of verification probability of Pc,r versus the column index c 
(adding one edge originating from Pc,r, ε=0.2) 
 
Figure 3-9 shows the increment of verification probability for the dependent 
packets of P1,r whose verification probability is increased by 0.05. We can see that the 
packet has noticeable impact on its dependent packets in the next two columns only. 
For the dependent packets that are more than 2 columns away from P1,r, the impact is 
negligible. Similar results are observed when the verification probability of packets in 
other columns is changed. 
Combining Figure 3-8 and Figure 3-9, we can compute the overall benefit of 
adding an edge to a butterfly, as shown in Figure 3-10. The maximum benefit is 
obtained when the edge is placed in the middle column. The overall benefit is smallest 
for the first and last column. Packets in the last column do not have any dependent 
packets, so adding to the last column cannot enjoy the second benefit. Although 
packets in the first column have many dependent packets, adding one edge does not 
help a lot for their own verification probability. Therefore, the edges should be added 
progressively from middle column to outer columns. For example, in a butterfly with 
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17 columns, the best order should be column-9, 8, 10, 7, 11, 6, 12, 5, 13, 4, 14, 3, 15, 
2, 1, and 16. Note that the benefits for columns from 4 to 13 are almost identical. 
 
Figure 3-9 – Increment of verification probability for the dependent packets of a 
column-1 packet P1,r whose verification probability is increased by 0.05 (ε=0.2) 
 
 
Figure 3-10 – Increment in overall verification percentage when 1 edge is added to different 
columns of a butterfly with 17 columns. 
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3.2.2 Relaxing Butterfly Structure 
The goal of this section is to overcome the second and third limitations of the 
Butterfly Authentication graph. We examine how to relax the Butterfly structure to (a) 
support an arbitrary number of packets N, and (b) to confine the signature packet to 
within one MTU. 
In the original Butterfly graph, the signature packet grows with the total 
number of packets N, as it contains the digital signature and the hashes of all packets 
in the first column. If the signature packet is too big to fit in one MTU, it has to be 
fragmented for transmission, which increases its loss probability and negatively 
impacts the verification probability of all other packets. Alternatively, when N is 
large, we can divide the N packets into smaller groups and form a butterfly graph 
within each group. However, this simple approach has high overhead and complexity, 
since there is one signature packet per group and signature packet is costly in terms of 
computation and transmission. This is exacerbated by the fact that each signature 
packet needs to be transmitted multiple times to avoid loss. We have found that we 
can overcome this problem, without incurring significant loss in performance, by 
limiting the number of rows (NR) so that the signature packet is confined within one 
MTU, and the extra packets are appended at the end of the graph by adding additional 
columns. Any consecutive log2NR+1 columns taken from this relaxed graph constitute 
a Butterfly graph. Figure 3-11 shows an example with NR=4 and NC=8. Note that any 
3 consecutive columns form a Butterfly graph of 12 packets. Therefore, to support an 
arbitrary number N, we can first construct a butterfly graph, and then append extra 




Figure 3-11 – Relaxed Butterfly graph with 4 rows and 8 columns 
 
In the Butterfly graph, all packets within a column have the same verification 
probability, which drops for the first 2 columns and then becomes flat for the 
subsequent columns. The relaxed butterfly graph also has this property, as shown in 
Figure 3-12 which compares the verification probability of packets from different 
columns in a Butterfly (128x8) and a relaxed Butterfly graph (64x16). It shows that 
the extra columns in the relaxed butterfly have flat verification probability. Note that 
the result in Figure 3-12 is obtained by assuming the signature packet is always 
received. Without this assumption, the relaxed butterfly will have better performance 
because its signature packets size is much smaller than that of the original butterfly. 
 
Figure 3-12 – Verification probability of packets in different columns of Butterfly and Relaxed 
butterfly graph (ε=0.1) 
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3.2.3 Generalized Butterfly Graph 
This section proposes the Generalized Butterfly Graph (GBG) framework, and 
describes how to design an efficient authentication graph, based on the prior analysis. 
Given N packets, a GBG is constructed as a matrix with NR rows and NC 
columns, where NR=2K and ⎡ ⎤RC NNN = . A packet in r-th row and c-th column is 
referred to as Pc,r, where 0≤r<NR and 0≤c<NC. The signature packet PSIGN contains the 
signature and hashes of all packets in the first column. A packet Pc,r is connected to 
Pc-1,r and is possibly connected to other packets in column c-1. Note that the GBG 
framework covers many possible graphs. For instance, when NR=1, the GBG graph is 
the same as the Simple Hash Chain [31]; when NR=N, the GBG graph is equivalent to 
Tree-Authentication [29] with degree N. In addition, if N=NR(log2NR+1), the GBG 
graph is exactly the same as a Butterfly graph. In the proposed GBG framework, we 
examine how to design an efficient authentication graph. The input parameters 
include the total number of packets N, the overhead budget RO, the packet loss rate ε, 
and the maximum transmission unit (MTU); the output parameters include NR and NC, 
the number of transmissions of signature packet M, and the graph topology (edge 
placement). The following subsections discuss how to choose the appropriate values 
for these output parameters. 
3.2.3.1 Number of Rows and Columns 
The value of NR has two implications: it determines the size of the signature packet 
which contains signature (g bytes) and hashes (h bytes per hash) of all packets in the 
first column; it also affects robustness against network loss. For instance, if NR is too 
big, the signature packet has to be fragmented for transmission, which negatively 
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affects overall verification probability. On the other hand, if NR is too small, a burst 
loss of length NR may cut the graph into two halves and the second half cannot be 
verified anymore. Therefore, NR should be chosen to be the maximum number 
satisfying two conditions: NR=2K and g+NRh≤MTU, where K is a positive integer. 
3.2.3.2 Number of Transmissions for Signature Packet 
If the signature packet is lost, all the other packets are not verifiable, and therefore it 
has to be transmitted multiple times to avoid loss. However, every transmission is 
counted towards the overhead budget. For instance, if the signature packet is 
transmitted M times, the overhead budget left for the other packets is RO-M(g+NRh) 
bytes. A small value of M leads to high loss probability of the signature packet, while 
a large value of M leads to fewer edges in the graph for a given overhead budget. A 
one-dimensional search can be performed to find the optimal value for M, e.g., Figure 
3-13 shows the verification percentage with different values of M. (Experiment 
setting: N=1024, RO= 40960 bytes, g=128, h=20, MTU=1500 and ε =0.1). 
 
Figure 3-13 – Verification probability for various values of M 
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3.2.3.3 Edge Placement Strategy 
Given a NR by NC GBG, the initial graph topology (as in Figure 3-5) and M 
transmissions of signature packet occupy Rinit = M(g+NRh)+(N-NR)h bytes. Therefore, 
the remaining overhead budget is RO-Rinit, corresponding to ( )O inite R R h⎢ ⎥= −⎣ ⎦  extra 
edges which can be placed using the algorithm illustrated in Figure 3-14. The extra 
edges are placed in a round-robin manner, starting from packets in the middle column 
and progressively going outwards to the second column and the last column. After 
one round, if there is still extra edge left, the edge placement algorithm will repeat the 






Figure 3-14 – Algorithm to allocate e extra edges in (NRxNC) GBG graph 
 
EdgePlacement(NR, NC, e) { 
int L, R, round=0; 
 
while(e > 0) { 
   if(NC%2==0)  
     L = R = NC/2 
   else 
     L = NC/2;    R = L + 1; 
 
   for( ; L>0 && e>0; L--, R++) { 
     for(int i=0; i<NR && e>0; i++) { 
       if(round == 0) 
         create an edge from Pi,L with butterfly constraint; 
       else 
         create an edge from Pi,L to the first node in column L-1 with least incoming 
edges; 
       e --; 
     } //end for 
     if(L == R)        continue; 
     for(int i=0; i<NR && e>0; i++) { 
       if(round == 0) 
         create an edge from Pi,R with butterfly constraint; 
       else 
         create an edge from Pi,R to the first node in column R-1 with least incoming 
edges; 
       e --; 
     } //end for 
   } //end for 
   round ++; 
 }//end while 
} //end EdgePlacement(..) 
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Note that the receiver can deduce the graph topology, given the values of N, 
NR and RO. Therefore, these three parameters are signaled in a header in the signature 
packet. The overhead corresponding to these three parameters is negligible, compared 
with hashes and signatures. 
3.2.4 Performance Evaluation 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed GBG authentication graph, we 
implemented 4 authentication graph methods and measure their performances in the 
following settings: N=1024, ε=0.01~0.2, MTU=1500, g=128 and h=20. The first 
method is the proposed GBG method with NR=64 and NC=16, the extra edges are 
placed using the algorithm in Figure 3-15, and the optimal value of M is selected by a 
one-dimensional search. The second method is EMSS authentication [33] where each 
packet is connected to a packet that is randomly selected from the preceding 64 
packets and the signature packet contains the hash of the first 10 packets. The third 
method is Augmented Chain [34] C15,7, where each packet is connected to a previous 
packet and another packet that is 8 packets away in the high-level chain, and 14 
packets are iteratively inserted between two consecutive packets in high-level chain. 
The fourth method is the Butterfly graph with NR=128 and NC=8, and the signature 
packet contains hashes of all packets in the first column. 
Figure 3-15 compares the LAF of the four approaches at various overhead 
levels for ε=0.1. The proposed GBG authentication method always outperforms (i.e., 
lower LAF) the other methods at all overheads. Further, when overhead is below 40 
bytes per packet (i.e., 2 hashes/packet), it significantly outperforms EMSS. The other 
two methods, Butterfly and Augmented Chain, cannot be configured to have overhead 
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lower than 40 bytes per packet. However, when the overhead is greater than 40 bytes 
per packet, the performance gap is becoming smaller and smaller. 
 
Figure 3-15 – Comparison of LAF at various overhead (ε=0.1) 
 
Figure 3-16 compares the LAF of the four methods at various packet loss rates 
ranging from 0.01 to 0.2, where the overhead is fixed at 40 bytes per packet (i.e., 
around 2 hashes/packet). It shows that the proposed GBG method outperforms the 
other three methods at all loss rates. Note that although the performance gap between 
GBG and EMSS is small, GBG has much lower receiver delay than EMSS. For 
instance, a received packet can be immediately verified using GBG, because the 
signature is the first packet in the graph and all edges are pointing backward. 
However, using EMSS, a received packet cannot be verified because the signature is 
the last packet in the graph and all edges are pointing forward. 
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Figure 3-16 – Comparison of LAF at various loss rates (overhead = 40 bytes per packet) 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we propose the Butterfly Authentication method, which exploits the 
fault-tolerance property of a butterfly graph. The analysis and experimental results 
demonstrate that the Butterfly Authentication method outperforms the existing graph-
based authentication methods. However, the Butterfly Authentication has its own 
limitations, like fixed overhead, inflexible number of packets and potentially large 
signature packet. To overcome the abovementioned limitations, we propose a 
Generalized Butterfly Graph (GBG) framework and describe how to design a graph to 
maximize the verification probability given the total number of packets, overhead 
budget and packet loss rate. Experimental results demonstrate the performance 
improvement over the other methods. 
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CHAPTER 4 -  CONTENT-AWARE STREAM AUTHENTICATION 
Existing stream authentication methods [29][31][33][34][35] and the methods 
proposed in Chapter 3 give different ways of constructing an authentication graph 
with the aim to maximize the verification probability, for a given overhead. They 
assume all packets are equally important and the verification probability is 
proportional to the media quality for media stream, i.e., maximizing verification 
probability is equivalent to maximizing media quality. 
However, this assumption is not true in many cases, especially for media 
stream. Figure 4-1 gives the distribution of packets’ importance in a JPEG 2000 
codestream for an image “Bike” (2048x2560) in Figure 4-4(c). The image is encoded 
with 16 layers and 160 packets per layer. The importance of a packet is measured by 
its distortion increment, which is the amount by which the overall distortion will 
decrease if the packet is decoded. From Figure 4-1, we can see that the packets’ 
importance exhibits huge differences. Out of the 2560 packets, 2464 packets (more 
than 96%) have a distortion increment of less than 100 MSE units, and the rest of the 
packets (96 packets, less than 4%) have much greater distortion increment. In other 
words, a small number of packets are much more important than the rest. This 
characteristic is often exploited via Unequal Error Protection (UEP) to transport 
media data over a lossy network. For instance, more important packets are allocated 




Figure 4-1 – Distribution of packets’ distortion increment in a JPEG 2000 codestream 
(Bike 2048x2560) 
 
Similarly, stream authentication can also exploit this characteristic of unequal 
importance to maximize the quality of authenticated media. Towards this goal, we 
differentiate the packets based on their importance, which can be obtained from the 
media encoding process. Some media formats provide packet importance information 
in their syntax. For example, JPSEC [4] and JPWL [5] have distortion field and MP4 
file format [10] has hint track. More important packets are allocated with more 
overhead and thereby have high verification probability, while less important packets 
are allocated with less overhead. In other words, we formulate an optimization 
framework to compute an authentication graph to minimize the expected distortion of 
the authenticated media for a given overhead and given knowledge of packet loss rate, 
or conversely minimize the overhead for a given distortion. To differentiate from 
existing stream authentication methods which are all focusing on maximizing the 
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verification probability, we therefore name the proposed method as content-aware 
stream authentication. 
In this chapter, section 4.1 describes the proposed distortion-overhead 
optimization framework for stream authentication. Section 4.2 describes how to build 
a content-aware optimized authentication graph under the proposed distortion-
overhead optimization framework. Section 4.3 proposes a simplified authentication 
graph which has low complexity to construct. Finally, Section 4.4 presents analysis 
and performance evaluation for the proposed methods. 
4.1 DISTORTION-OVERHEAD OPTIMIZATION FRAMEWORK 
The problem of authenticating a media stream can be solved in the Distortion-
Overhead Optimization framework, which is used to construct an authentication graph 
trading off two conflicting goals: minimal authentication overhead and minimal 
distortion (or maximal media quality). Given a specific overhead and network 
condition, we try to compute an authentication graph that minimizes the expected 
distortion of the authenticated media at the receiver. Conversely, the optimized 
authentication graph minimizes the authentication overhead, given a specific 
distortion and network condition. In other words, the distortion-overhead performance 
of the optimized graph lies on the lower convex hull of the set of all achievable 
distortion-overhead performances. 
Recall that an authentication graph is a DAG, where a packet corresponds to a 
node. A directed edge from a packet A to another packet B is realized by appending 
A’s hash to B, where packets A and B are referred to as the source node (or source 
packet) and target node (or target packet), respectively. The redundancy degree of a 
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packet is the number of edges originating from it, which also indicates the number of 
replicated copies of its hash that are appended to other packets. In particular, the 
redundancy degree is zero for a signature packet, as there is no edge originating from 
a signature packet. 
To formulate the distortion-overhead optimization problem, we define nθ as 
the set of target nodes of the edges originating from the packet Pn, and the redundancy 
degree of Pn is number of elements in nθ , nθ . The variable nθ  is also referred to as 
topology policy for packet Pn. For example in Figure 1-4(a), packet P2 has 
{ }2 0 1,P Pθ =  and its redundancy degree is 2. The signature packet is a special case 
with no edge originating from it, and therefore its redundancy degree is 0. Given a set 
of N packets, the overall topology policy [ ]0 1 1, ,... ...n Nθ θ θ θ θ −=  uniquely defines the 
topology of the authentication graph. Denoting the total authentication overhead 
(including signature and hashes) as O and the overall media distortion as D, our goal 
is to find the optimal vector *θ that minimizes the expected Lagrangian in Eq(4.1) for 
a given 0λ > . The Lagrange multiplier λ  is used to control the trade-off between the 
overhead O and the expected distortion D. For instance, a smaller value of λ will 
result in an optimized vector *θ leading to smaller expected distortion and higher 
overhead, and vice versa. 
 * arg min( )D O
θ
θ λ= +  (4.1) 
The authentication overhead O is the extra bytes introduced for stream 
authentication. For instance, it includes the digital signature and the hashes appended 
to the packets. Therefore, the authentication overhead O is a function of the graph 
topologyθ , as expressed in Eq(4.2), where g is the size of a digital signature and h is 
the size of a crypto hash.  
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O g hθ θ−
=
= +∑  (4.2) 
Recall that an authenticated media is decoded exclusively from packets that 
are both decodable and verifiable. A decodable but unverifiable packet should not be 
used for media decoding because of security concern; however, a verifiable but 
undecodable packet is also meaningless. Therefore, the expected distortion can be 
expressed as in Eq(4.3), assuming distortion is additive and D0 is the distortion when 
no packet is received. For instance, if a packet Pn is both decodable ( nξ  is the 
probability of being decodable) and verifiable ( ( )nV θ is the probability of being 
verifiable), its distortion increment ndΔ will be deducted from D0. Note that nξ is 
equivalent to the probability that the packet Pn is received and all the packets it 
depends on for decoding are received and verified. Also note that ( )nV θ is a function 
of the topology policy nθ , i.e., the verification probability is determined by how the 
packet is connected to the other packets in the authentication graph. 





D D d Vθ ξ θ−
=
= − Δ∑  (4.3) 
With Eq(4.1), Eq(4.2) and Eq(4.3), we define a distortion-overhead 
optimization framework which can be used to search for a graph topology θ to 
achieve minimized distortion of the authenticated media for a given overhead, or 
conversely to achieve minimized overhead for a given distortion. The problem is 
solved in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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4.2 A CONTENT-AWARE OPTIMIZED STREAM AUTHENTICATION 
METHOD 
This section proposes methods to build a content-aware optimized authentication 
graph. We start by assuming a general layered media format shown in Figure 4-2 with 
L layers and Q packets per layer, where each packet depends on all the corresponding 
lower layer packets for decoding. For instance, a packet lqP is decodable if packet 
l
qP
′ is received and verifiable for all 0 l l′≤ < . In the rest of this chapter, the notation is 
changed for convenience of representing packets in layered media format. A packet 
l
qP has a distortion increment
l
qdΔ , topology policy lqθ , probability of being decodable 
l
qξ  and verification probability ( )lqV θ . 
To authenticate a layered media data with L layers and Q packets per layer, the 
most vital step is to find the optimized graph topology in the distortion-overhead 
optimization framework proposed in Section 4.1. The Lagrangian expression in 
Eq(4.1) can be rewritten for layered media data as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )110
0 0
QL
l l l l
q q q q
l q
J D O
D g d V h
θ θ λ θ
λ ξ θ λ θ−−
= =
= +
= + + −Δ +∑∑
.
 (4.4) 
Given a Lagrange multiplier 0λ > , we need to find the optimized topology 
policy θ  that minimizes the Lagrangian ( )J θ . This can be accomplished in two 
steps: the first step is to determine the topology policy lqθ  for all high layer packets lqθ  
where 0 l L< < and 0 q Q≤ < , as detailed in Section 4.2.1. The second step is to 
determine the topology policy 0qθ  of a layer-0 packet 0qP  where 0 q Q≤ < , as detailed 
in Section 4.2.2. 
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Figure 4-2 – General layered media format with L layers and Q packets per layer 
4.2.1 Topology Policy for High-Layer Packets 
In the layered media data depicted in Figure 4-2, a high layer packet is not decodable 
unless all the corresponding lower layer packets are decodable and authenticated, i.e., 
l




 for all l′  such that 0 l l′≤ < , we say that 
l







 is an ancestor of 
l
qP . In this case, it is sufficient to have an edge originating 
from packet lqP  and ending at one of its ancestors. The reason is as follow: if a packet 
l
qP  is decodable (i.e., all its ancestors are decodable and verifiable), it is verifiable 
with probability of 1 as long as it has an edge connecting to one of its ancestors; if the 
packet is not decodable, it is meaningless to verify it. Furthermore, the target node of 
the only edge originating from lqP  is chosen to be its immediate ancestor 
1l
qP
− , i.e., 
{ }1l lq qPθ −= , because choosing any other ancestor is not optimal in the rate-distortion 
sense. Being a target node of an edge implies that a hash is appended to it, which will 
dilute its R-D importance. Since 1lqP
−
 is the least important packet among the 




Therefore, given the fixed topology policy for all other packets, the topology 
policy of lqP , { }1l lq qPθ −= , minimizes the Lagrangian ( )J θ  as the resulting 
verification probability ( )lqV θ  is equal to 1 and the redundancy degree lqθ  takes the 
smallest value of 1. Therefore, the topology policy for all high layer packets should be 
{ }1l lq qPθ −= , where 0 l L< < and 0 q Q≤ < , in order to obtain optimized distortion-
overhead performance. 
4.2.2 Topology Policy for Layer-0 Packets 
After determining the topology policy for high layer packets, the decoding probability 
of a packet lqP  can be expressed as in Eq(4.5), where 
l
qε  is the probability that packet 
l
qP  is not received. In other words, the packet 
l
qP  is decodable if and only if all its 
ancestors (namely, 0 1 1, ,..., lq q qP P P
− ) and lqP  itself are received, and the layer-0 packet, 
0
qP , is verifiable. 







Vξ θ ε ′
′=
= −∏  (4.5) 
Substituting Eq(4.5) into Eq(4.4), the Lagrangian ( )J θ can be expressed as 
Eq(4.6) 
 















J D g d V h
where P when l









To ensure the authentication graph is acyclic, we mandate that for edges with 
source node 0qP , the target node must be 
0
qP ′ , where q q′ < . At this step, the goal is to 
find the optimized topology policy for each layer-0 packet that minimizes the 
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Lagrangian ( )J θ . The straightforward method is exhaustive each, but its high 
computational complexity is not acceptable. A more practical approach is to use an 
iterative descent algorithm [84], where the objective function ( )J θ  is minimized by 
searching for optimized topology policy for one packet at a time, keeping the other 
packets’ policies fixed. These steps are repeated until the Lagrangian ( )J θ  
converges. For instance, let ( ) 0 0 00 1 10 (0), (0),..., (0)Qθ θ θ θ −⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  be the initial topology 
policy for all layer-0 packets, the policy at the n-th iteration, 
( ) 0 0 00 1 1( ), ( ),..., ( )Qn n n nθ θ θ θ −⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  where n>0, is determined as follows.  At the n-th 
iteration, we select one packet, say, 0qP , to find its 
0
qθ . For any q q′ ≠ , let 






0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 0










θ θ θ θ θ
μ θ λ θ
−=
= +  (4.7) 










⎛ ⎞= Δ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∏  (4.8) 
At the n-th iteration, we need to search for a topology policy for a particular 
packet that minimizes the Lagrangian value. In subsequent iterations, the same 
process is repeated for a different packet. The utility value 0qμ  of the packet 0qP , as 
expressed in Eq(4.8), can be regarded as the amount by which the overall distortion 
will increase if 0qP is not verifiable given that it is decodable. The utility value 
0
qμ can 
be derived by taking the partial derivative of Eq(4.6) with respect to ( )0qV θ . 
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Therefore, the larger the utility value 0qμ  is, the more attractive it is to increase its 
verification probability ( )0qV θ  and to increase its redundancy degree 0qθ . 
During these optimization iterations, the Lagrangian ( )J θ  is non-increasing 
and has a lower bound of 0, so convergence is guaranteed. However, we cannot 
guarantee that it can reach a global minimal. To increase the chances of reading the 
global minimal, one alternative solution is to invoke the optimization process with 
multiple initial topology policy vectors, and choose the resulting vector that incurs the 
smallest Lagrangian values. 
4.3 A SIMPLIFIED AUTHENTICATION GRAPH 
Building the distortion-overhead optimized graph is computationally intensive 
because many iterations are required before convergence, and each iteration needs to 
search for the optimal topology policy for the selected packet. In this section, we 
empirically build a simplified authentication graph which requires much lower 
computation complexity. 
For the high layer packets lqP  (where 0 l L< < ), their topology policies are 
exactly the same as the distortion-overhead optimized graph, i.e. lqP  has only one 
edge connecting to its immediate ancestor 1lqP
− . For each packet 0qP  in layer 0, we 
first compute the utility value 0mμ  using Eq(4.8). After that, the packets are sorted into 
a list where the utility values are in descending order. The sorted list, denoted by SL, 
is then divided into S segments, namely, Seg0, Seg1…, SegS-1. Each packet in Segi has 
iγ  outgoing edges whose target packets are randomly selected from the preceding 
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packets in SL. The redundancy degree in consecutive segments is in decreasing order, 
i.e. 0 1 1... Sγ γ γ −> > > . There are a number of possible segmentation methods. One is 
based on equal segment size. Another method is based on utility value, e.g., Segi 
contains all packets with utility value falling in [ )min min, ( 1)i iμ η μ η+ × + + × , where 
minμ  and maxμ are the lowest and highest utility values, respectively, and 
( )max min Sη μ μ= − . The first method makes it easier to control the average 
redundancy degree, while the second method has slightly better performance, because 
its overhead allocation is more related to the packets’ utility value. The signature 
packet contains the hashes of the first Z packets in SL. The parameter Z is typically 
sufficient to be 3 and our experiment uses Z=3. Table 4-1 summarizes the above 
parameters used for constructing the authentication graph. Through experiments, we 
found that it is typically sufficient to have equal-sized segmentation, S=3 
and 0 1 21 2γ γ γ= + = + , where the redundancy degree is 1γ  on average. 
Table 4-1 – Parameters and semantics of the proposed simplified authentication scheme 
Parameters Semantics 
S The number of segments. If S is 1, all lowest layer packets 
have the same redundancy degree 
iγ  The redundancy degree of packet in Segi. 
Z The number of packets whose hashes are included in the 
signature packet 
 
The algorithm for constructing a simplified authentication graph is 
summarized in Figure 4-3(a), which is illustrated in Figure 4-3(b) using a layered 
media stream with 3 layers and 8 packets per layer, assuming that all packets are non-
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empty. This example uses the following parameters: S=2, 20 =γ , 11 =γ , and Z=2. 
First, for each high layer packet imP (i>0), an edge is created from imP
 to its immediate 
ancestor 1imP − . Second, for packets in layer 0, we compute their utility values, sort them 
and divide them into S=2 segments of equal size. After that, for each packet in 
segment 0, 0γ =2 outgoing edges are created with the target packet randomly chosen 
from the proceeding packets in the sorted list, and similarly for packets in segment 1. 
Finally, a signature packet is created containing the hash of the first 2 packets in the 
sorted list. 
 
Figure 4-3 – Algorithm and example of constructing a simplified authentication graph 
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4.4 ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section analyzes the optimized content-aware authentication method and 
compares it with existing methods, in various aspects like complexity, overhead, 
sender delay, receiver delay, verification probability and quality of authenticated 
media. 
4.4.1 Comparison with Existing Methods 
Since the proposed content-aware optimized stream authentication methods are based 
on DAG, we choose graph-based authentication methods for comparison, including 
Simple Hash Chain [31], Tree Authentication [29], EMSS [33], Augmented Chain 
[34] and Butterfly Authentication. The performance criteria are complexity, overhead, 
verification probability, sender delay and receiver delay, which have been explained 
in Section 1.2.5. 
Table 4-2 – Comparison of the content-aware authentication method against the existing methods 
 
Table 4-2 summarizes the performance of these six authentication schemes. 
The values are obtained based on the following assumptions: 1) A digital signature is 
 91 
amortized to a group of N packets; 2) h is the size of a hash and g is the size of a 
digital signature; and 3) The tree-authentication method uses a binary tree (i.e., degree 
of two); (4) The augmented chain is parameterized by variables a and p, which are 
named in [34] as the chain length and packet buffer size on the sender side, 
respectively. 
In terms of computation overhead, the Tree-authentication scheme has to 
perform about N more hash operations than the other schemes. In terms of sender 
delay and receiver delay, the Augmented Chain has the worst performance, while the 
other schemes are the same. 
The Simple Hash Chain has the smallest overhead (only one hash per packet), 
but its verification probability is also the lowest. On the other hand, Tree-
authentication has the highest overhead but also the highest verification probability. 
These two methods are two extreme cases (one favors lower overhead while the other 
favors higher verification probability), while all other methods try to achieve a 
balance in-between. In particular, both EMSS and the proposed content-aware method 
can be configured with different overheads, resulting in different verification 
probabilities. The Augmented Chain and Butterfly Authentication have fixed 
overhead. In this regard, EMSS and the proposed content-aware method are more 
flexible and generically applicable since their overhead level is tunable. 
The above comparisons are for streaming general data packets. However, for 
media streams, we should use different benchmark criteria. The most important 
performance measure should be the PSNR of the authenticated image rather than the 
verification probability of the delivered packets. In this regard, our content-aware 
scheme is more efficient than existing schemes due to two reasons: 
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1. It eliminates all the unnecessary edges (therefore reduce the overhead) that can 
help to increase the verification probability only, but do not help to increase the 
PSNR of the authenticated image. For example, if packet Pi depends on Pj, it is 
sufficient to have an edge from Pi to Pj, and any edge from Pi to any other packet 
does not help to improve the PSNR of the authenticated image. 
2. The overhead is used in a more efficient manner. The more important packets 
have more outgoing edges (i.e., higher redundancy degree), which help to increase 
the PSNR, while the less important packets (which account for a large proportion 
of the total packets) have less outgoing edges (i.e., smaller redundancy degree), 
resulting in smaller overhead.  
4.4.2 Security Analysis 
Similar to the existing graph-based authentication methods, the content-aware 
authentication method relies on the hash chaining and digital signature. Therefore, the 
security strength of this scheme is the same as the underlying cryptographic 
algorithms. For example, SHA-1 can be used for one-way hashing and RSA can be 
used for signature generation and verification. For more details on security strength, 
refer to Merkle’s tree authentication [30]. 
4.4.3 Discussion of Utility Values 
As every network has a MTU size, a large packet has to be segmented into 
smaller datagrams for transmission. Therefore, the probability of losing the packet lqP , 
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l
qε , can be expressed in Eq(4.9), where ε  is the loss probability of each network 
datagram (here we assume i.i.d random loss) and lmR  is the size of 
l
qP  in bytes. 
 ( )1 1 lqR MTUlqε ε ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= − −  (4.9) 
By substituting Eq(4.9) into Eq(4.8), we can see that the utility value, lqμ , is 
determined by the distortion increment values of its descendent packets, packet sizes 
of its descendent packets, the loss probability ε , and the MTU. If the packet size lqR  
is big, it needs more datagrams for transmission, thereby decreasing its probability of 
being received. So, given a fixed value for ε and MTU, the packet lqP  will have a 
greater utility value when its descendent packets have larger distortion value and 
smaller size.  
However, the value of the MTU varies with physical network links, e.g., 
Ethernet has a MTU of about 1500 bytes and the ATM network has a MTU of 53 
bytes. When a communication path between two end hosts consists of different 
physical links, the smallest MTU can be discovered by the end host using the path 
MTU discovery protocol [85]. 
To derive the utility values, the sender also needs to know the network loss 
probability ε . The sender could presume a reasonable value for it, or could estimate it 
based on past communications. For instance, the Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) 
[86] specifies the window-based measurement techniques for estimating the loss 
probability. However, for the simplified authentication graph, it is not important to 
have an accurate value of ε , because it does not change the relative order of the 
utility values in the sorted list SL.  
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4.4.4 Experimental Results 
This section experimentally compares our content-aware authentication method 
against EMSS, Augmented Chain and Butterfly authentication methods to further 
demonstrate the validity of our proposed scheme. We choose JPEG 2000 coded 
images in our experiment. 
We implement five schemes, namely, WITHOUT_AUTH, EMSS_AUTH, 
C_A_AUTH, AC_AUTH and BUTTERFLY_AUTH. The first scheme, 
WITHOUT_AUTH, simply sends the packets in the order they appear in the JPEG-
2000 codestream, and no authentication is applied. This scheme provides a reference 
for the achievable distortion performance if verification is not required. Note that this 
scheme provides an upper bound on the performance of all authentication schemes. 
The second scheme, EMSS_AUTH, implements the EMSS authentication [33], where 
every packet has the same redundancy degree. The third scheme, C_A_AUTH, 
implements the proposed content-aware authentication using the simplified 
authentication graph as proposed in Section 4.3. Through simulation, we find that the 
content-aware scheme yields good performance when the parameter S is 3. Further 
increasing S does not produce substantial performance improvement, because its 
performance is already quite close to the upper bound when S is set to 3. The fourth 
scheme, AC_AUTH, implements the Augmented Chain [34], and the fifth scheme, 
BUTTERFLY_AUTH, implements the butterfly authentication. For all schemes, the 
packets are sent in the order they appear in JPEG-2000 codestreams, while the 
signature packet is sent multiple times to minimize its loss probability. 
The network is modeled by an i.i.d distribution, where the average loss 
probability ranges from 0 to 0.15. In addition, the MTU is set to 1500 bytes, as used in 
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Ethernet. Our experiment uses 8 JPEG-2000 testing images (each 2560x2048 pixels). 
Each image has 4 resolution levels and 260 packets per layer, and we vary the number 
of layers in the experiments. The test images used in our experiments are shown in 
Figure 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-4 – The testing images used in the experiments 
 
The first experiment is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the authentication 
redundancy adapted to the distortion. The JPEG 2000 images are encoded with only 1 
layer, so C_A_AUTH can take advantage of the distortion information but not the 
layer structure. For C_A_AUTH, the parameters are set as follows: S=3, 30 =γ , 
1 2γ = , 2 1γ = , and Z=6, so the redundancy degree is 2 on average. The other schemes 
use a similar level of redundancy. Figure 4-5 gives the PSNR of the five schemes. 
C_A_AUTH consistently outperforms the other schemes at all network loss rates. In 
fact, the PSNR curve of C_A_AUTH  is very close to that of WITHOUT_AUTH, 
which achieves our original design goal, because the authentication overhead is added 
in an optimized manner. 
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Figure 4-6 shows the verification probabilities of the four authentication 
schemes. When the loss rate is less than 0.1, C_A_AUTH has a slightly lower 
verification probability, because one third of the packets have redundancy degree of 1. 
When the loss rate is larger than 0.1, a flat redundancy degree of 2 for all packets is 
not enough, which causes a dramatic decrease for EMSS_AUTH, AC_AUTH and 
BUTTERFLY_AUTH. For C_A_AUTH, such decrease is relatively small because one 
third of the packets still have redundancy degree of 3. 
From Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6, we can see that although C_A_AUTH 
sometimes has lower verification probability than the other authentication schemes, it 
produces higher PSNR. The C_A_AUTH is able to achieve near distortion-overhead 
optimized performance, as the authentication overhead is added in a more cost-
effective manner. The packets are differentiated according to their importance, more 
important packets have higher verification probability and less important packets have 
lower authentication overhead. 
 




Figure 4-6 – Verification probability at various loss rates (2 hashes/packet on average 
with 1 layer) 
 
The second experiment is to evaluate the proposed system when both 
distortion and layer structure are utilized. Accordingly, the JPEG 2000 codestreams 
are encoded with 6 layers. Thus, C_A_AUTH is able to take advantage of both the 
layer structure and the distortion information, but the other schemes are agnostic to 
both. The parameters for this experiment are the same as that for the previous 
experiment. Figure 4-7 shows the PSNR curves of the three systems, which are 
similar to those in Figure 4-5. 
Figure 4-8 compares the verification probabilities of the four authentication 
schemes. The C_A_AUTH has significantly lower verification probability than the 
other schemes. This is because higher layer packets have redundancy degree of only 
one in C_A_AUTH, resulting in lower verification probability. 
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Figure 4-7 – PSNR at various loss rates (2 hashes / packet on average, with 6 layers) 
 
 
Figure 4-8 – Verification probability at various loss rates (2 hashes / packet on average, 
with 6 layers) 
 
From the results of the previous two experiments (Figure 4-5, Figure 4-6, 
Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8), we can conclude that C_A_AUTH  has PSNR very close 
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to WITHOUT_AUTH. In addition, it consistently outperforms the other scheme in 
terms of PSNR, even though it may have lower verification probability. This is 
because the proposed C_A_AUTH method tries to optimize the quality of 
authenticated media, while the other methods try to optimize the verification 
probability. 
The third experiment evaluates the PSNR versus bit-rate curve for transmitting 
the authenticated image over a lossy network. The JPEG 2000 codestreams are also 
encoded with 6 layers. All authentication schemes have the same average redundancy 
degree of 2. The network loss probability is set to 0.05, because higher loss 
probability will flatten the rate-PSNR curve. All other parameters are the same as in 
the second experiment. Figure 4-9 shows the PSNR curves. Again, at all image bit-
rates, C_A_AUTH achieves a PSNR close to WITHOUT_AUTH. It consistently 
outperforms the other schemes in terms of the media quality, due to the same reason 
as explained in previous experiment. 
 




The fourth experiment is to compare the performance of the four 
authentication schemes at various overhead levels. Again, we set the loss probability 
to 0.05. The JPEG-2000 images are encoded with 1 layer, because we want 
C_A_AUTH to utilize the distortion information but not the layer structure. We 
measure the PSNR at various overhead levels, ranging from 1 to 6 hashes per packet. 
Figure 4-10 shows that at a loss rate 0.05 the proposed scheme outperforms the other 
schemes when the redundancy degree is less then 3. When the loss rate is higher, the 
improvement of the proposed scheme over the other schemes will be further 
increased. 
 
Figure 4-10 – PSNR at various redundancy degrees (loss rate = 0.05, with 6 layers) 
 
The fifth experiment is to measure the minimum overhead required to achieve 
a PSNR that is 99% of WITHOUT_AUTH. The JPEG-2000 codestreams have one 
layer, for the same reason as the previous experiment. As shown in Figure 4-11, 
C_A_AUTH requires the overhead to be 2 hashes per packet when the loss rate is not 
greater than 0.1, and requires the overhead to be 3 hashes per packet otherwise. 
However, EMSS_AUTH requires much more overhead in order to maintain the same 
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PSNR level. The reason for Figure 4-11 is that C_A_AUTH is aware of the 
importance of different packets and optimally allocate the authentication overhead to 
achieve maximized media quality, while EMSS_AUTH simply ignores the unequal 
packet importance and thereby treats all packets equally. 
 
Figure 4-11 – Minimum overhead required to achieve 99% PSNR at various loss rates 
(with 1 layer) 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we have proposed an optimized content-aware authentication method, 
which is able to achieve distortion-overhead optimization by utilizing information 
about the coding structure and media content. The main contributions are summarized 
as follows. 
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• For authenticating media stream delivered over lossy network, instead of 
optimizing the verification probability, we focus on optimizing authenticated 
media quality. 
• We proposed a distortion-overhead optimization framework for media 
authentication. Given a specific authentication overhead, the proposed method 
computes an authentication graph that minimizes the distortion of the 
authenticated image at the receiver. 
• In view that the optimization process has high computational complexity, we also 
proposed a simplified authentication graph construction that requires much lower 
complexity to compute. 
• Through system analysis and simulation, we demonstrated that the proposed 
method achieves an R-D curve of the authenticated image which is very close to 
the R-D curve when no authentication is required, and it substantially outperforms 
existing schemes at all bit-rates and loss probabilities. 
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CHAPTER 5 -  RATE-DISTORTION-AUTHENTICATION OPTIMIZED 
MEDIA STREAMING 
Recent advances in media streaming include the Rate-Distortion Optimized (RaDiO) 
streaming techniques [35-47], which compute a transmission policy (or transmission 
schedule) that minimizes the expected end-to-end distortion, subject to a constraint on 
the average transmission rate. The transmission policy is computed based on the 
distortion increment, packet size and playout deadline of individual packets. For 
instance, a more important packet may be given more opportunities for transmission, 
and a packet with earlier playout deadline may be given higher priority for 
transmission. As a result, the performance gain of RaDiO techniques over heuristic 
streaming techniques like [51][52][53] is significant. 
Stream authentication provides a means for the receiver to verify the 
authenticity of received media stream, which is achieved by connecting the packets 
into a DAG. In other words, stream authentication creates dependency between 
packets, as packet loss may cause some other packets to be unverifiable. 
Ideally, we would like to have both R-D optimized media quality, as produced 
by RaDiO, and assurance of media authenticity. However, when the RaDiO technique 
is applied to a media stream protected using stream authentication, it will produce 
highly sub-optimal performance for authenticated media, because they optimize rate 
and distortion only. Here, the “rate” includes the data rate only and the “distortion” is 
measured between the original media and the decoded media (not the authenticated 
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media). For a media protected with stream authentication, a packet is associated with 
two additional parameters: authentication importance and overhead size, besides the 
distortion increment, packet size and playout deadline as used by RaDiO. The 
authentication importance of a packet is the amount of additional distortion due to the 
unverifiable packets caused by the loss this packet, and the overhead size is the size 
(in bytes) of authentication information appended to this packet (including crypto 
signature, hashes, or both). Conventional RaDiO techniques do not consider 
authentication and, therefore, are referred to as authentication-unaware streaming 
techniques. 
In this chapter, we propose a Rate-Distortion-Authentication (R-D-A) 
Optimized streaming technique to achieve optimized quality for authenticated media 
at the receiver. The R-D-A optimization is defined as a rate-distortion optimization for 
authenticated media, where the “rate” includes the data rate for coded media data and 
the authentication overhead, and the “distortion” is measured by the difference 
between the original media and the authenticated media. The R-D-A optimized 
technique is able to achieve optimized performance for authenticated media, as it 
accounts for the authentication importance and overhead size, besides the original R-
D dependency and parameters. 
Given a coded media with an authentication method applied, first we need to 
compute the quantities associated with each packet. The distortion increment, packet 
size and playout deadline are the same as that in conventional RaDiO techniques. The 
overhead size can be computed from the topology of the authentication graph. The 
authentication importance of a packet depends on the following factors: 1) the 
packet(s) whose verification is affected by this packet; 2) the distortion increment of 
the affected packets; 3) the loss probability of the affected packets; 4) how much 
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influence the packet has to the individual affected packets. Second, at every 
transmission opportunity, the R-D-A optimization process selects the best set of 
packets for transmission based on these parameters. For example, packets with higher 
importance (distortion increment + authentication importance) and smaller size 
(packet size + overhead size) will be assigned with more transmission opportunities. 
In summary, we formulate an R-D-A optimization problem to minimize the expected 
end-to-end distortion of the authenticated media at the receiver, subject to the 
constraint on average transmission rate. 
In stream authentication, a packet is useful, if and only if, it is received and 
verified before its playout deadline, i.e., a packet received or verified after its playout 
deadline is equivalent to loss. Nevertheless, even if a packet missed its playout 
deadline, it is still useful for verification of other packets that depends on this packet 
for verification. Therefore, each packet is actually associated with multiple deadlines: 
the first one is its own playout deadline, while the others are the playout deadlines of 
those packets that depend on this packet for verification. First, we examine the simple 
case in Section 5.1, where each packet is considered having a single deadline, namely, 
its own playout deadline. A packet received and verified after its playout deadline is 
discarded and therefore equivalent to loss. Considering that the proposed optimization 
algorithm has high complexity, we also propose a low-complexity algorithm. In 
Section 5.2, we examine the case where each packet has multiple deadlines as 
explained above. Section 5.3 illustrates how to realize the proposed R-D-A 
Optimization framework with various authentication methods. Section 5.4 validates 
the proposed technique with simulation results. 
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5.1 R-D-A OPTIMIZATION WITH SINGLE DEADLINE 
In single-deadline case, each packet is associated with four parameters: packet size B, 
distortion increment dΔ , playout deadline T and overhead size O. The distortion of 
the authenticated video is reduced by dΔ , if and only if, the packet is received and 
verified before its deadline T. 
Given that the signature packet PSIGN is received, let nϕ  be the set of packets 
that affects the verification probability of a packet Pn and nϕ  is referred to as a 
determining set of the packet Pn. Similarly, let nΦ  be the set of packets whose 
verification probability is affected by the packet Pn, and nΦ  is referred to as a 
dependent set of the packet Pn. For example in Figure 1-4(a), the determining set of 
P2 is { }2 0 1,P Pϕ =  and the dependent set of P1 is { }1 2 3,P PΦ = . Note that for 
simplicity, PSIGN is not included in the determining set of any packet, but of course, all 
packets depend on PSIGN for verification and this is accounted for separately. We 
assume that for any packet n nP ′ ∈Φ , its verification probability is a linear function of 
the loss probability of packet nP , as shown in Eq(5.1), where 
n
nα ′ and nnβ ′  are positive 
numbers. The term nnα ′ represents Pn’s influence on the verification probability of 
packet nP ′ , i.e. if Pn  is lost, the verification probability of nP ′  will be reduced by
n
nα ′ . 
Note that Pn has no influence on the verification of any packet n nP ′ ∉Φ . In Figure 
1-4(a), suppose PSIGN is received, if P1 is received, P2 will be verified with probability 
1; Otherwise, P2 depends on P0 for verification, i.e., P2's verification probability is 
reduced to (1-ε0), where ε0 is the loss probability of packet P0. Thus, the influence of 
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P1 on P2's verification probability is the difference, i.e. ( )21 0 01 1α ε ε= − − = . 
Similarly, we can compute P1’s influence on packet P3, i.e., 31 1α = . 
 ( )n nn n n nV α ε π β′ ′′ = − +  (5.1) 
The overhead size can be easily computed from the topology of the 
authentication graph. Assuming the hash size is h and the signature size is g, the 
overhead size of packet Pn can be expressed as: 
 n n nO e h m g= +  (5.2) 
The term ne  denotes the number of incoming edges to packet Pn, and nm is 1 if 
packet Pn is the signature packet and 0 otherwise. 
To transmit the given N packets (including the signature packet) with 
transmission policy [ ]0 2, ,...,SIGN Nπ π π π −= , the expected transmission cost is 
computed by summing up the transmission costs of individual packets, as shown in 
Eq(5.3). Recall that ( )nρ π is the per byte transmission cost for packet nP  using 
transmission policy nπ . This is similar to Eq(2.2) with the only exception of the 
overhead size being added to each packet. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2
0
N
SIGN SIGN SIGN n n n
n
R B O B Oπ ρ π ρ π−
=
= + + +∑  (5.3) 
With transmission policy π , the expected distortion of the authenticated video 
is expressed in Eq(5.4), where D0 is the total distortion when no packet is received or 
verified and nV  denotes the verification probability of packet nP . Recall that 
( )nε π denotes the loss probability of packet nP  using transmission policy nπ . The 
distortion of the authenticated video is computed by subtracting every packet’s 
distortion increment weighted by its probability of being received and being verifiable 
before its playout deadline.  
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 ( )( ) ( )( )20
0
( ) 1 1
N
SIGN SIGN n n n
n
D D d d Vπ ε π ε π−
=
⎛ ⎞= − − Δ + Δ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  (5.4) 
Substituting Eq(5.3) and Eq(5.4) into Eq(2.4), we get the Lagrangian cost 
function 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )






SIGN SIGN SIGN SIGN SIGN
N
SIGN n n n n n n
n
J D d B O
V d B O
π ε π λ ρ π
ε π ε π λ ρ π−
=
= + − − Δ + +
+ − − − Δ + +∑ . (5.5) 
This R-D-A optimization problem can be solved using an iterative descent 
algorithm, i.e. optimizing the policy for one packet at a time while keeping the other 
packets’ policy fixed, until the Lagrangian cost function ( )J π  converges. For 
instance, the policy can be decided by Eq(5.6) for PSIGN  and by (5.7) for Pn. 
 ( ) ( )* arg min
SIGN
SIGN SIGN SIGN SIGNπ
π ε π λ ρ π′= +  (5.6) 
 ( ) ( )* arg min
n
n n n nπ
π ε π λ ρ π′= +  (5.7) 
where ( )SIGN SIGN SIGN SIGNB O Sλ λ′ = + and ( )n n n nB O Sλ λ′ = + , and where 
SIGNS and nS are the sensitivity factors described next. The sensitivity factors, 
SIGNS and nS , can be obtained by taking partial derivatives of ( )D π with respect to 
( )SIGNε π  and ( )nε π , respectively, as shown in Eq(5.8) and Eq(5.9). 




SIGN SIGN n n n
n
S d d Vε π−
=
= Δ + Δ −∑  (5.8) 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1
n n
n
n SIGN n n SIGN n n n
P





= − Δ + − − Δ∑  (5.9) 
The sensitivity factor Sn represents the total expected distortion increment 
caused by the loss of the packet Pn, which comprises two parts: 1) the expected 
distortion increment due to the unsuccessful decoding of Pn itself (referred to as 
decoding importance), and; 2) the expected distortion increment due to the reduced 
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verification probability of all packets in its dependent set nΦ  (referred to as 
authentication importance). This is reflected in Eq(5.9), where the first term is the 
decoding importance SDn in Eq(5.10) and the second term is the authentication 
importance SAn in Eq(5.11). 
 ( )( )1n SIGN n nSD V dε π= − Δ  (5.10) 
 ( )( ) ( )( )1 1
n n
n
n SIGN n n n
P





= − − Δ∑  (5.11) 
In Eq(5.10), the decoding importance of Pn is simply the distortion increment 
multiplied by its verification probability and the receiving probability of the signature 
packet. Thus, a packet Pn has higher decoding importance if the following criteria are 
met: 1) Pn has higher distortion increment ndΔ ; 2) Pn has higher verification 
probability, and 3) PSIGN has lower loss probability. 
In Eq(5.11), the authentication importance of Pn is the sum of the distortion 
increments of all packet n nP ′ ∈Φ  weighted with their respective receiving probability, 
Pn’s influence on nP ′ ’s verification and the receiving probability of the signature 
packet. Thus, a packet Pn has higher authentication importance if the following 
criteria are met: 1) there are more packets in nΦ ; 2) the packets in nΦ  have higher 
distortion increment; 3) the packets in nΦ have lower loss probability; 4) Pn has 
higher influence on the packets in nΦ ; 5) SIGNP  has lower loss probability. 
The signature packet SIGNP  is a special case in that it does not depend on any 
other packet for verification, and thereby its decoding importance is 
simply SIGN SIGNSD d= Δ . On the other hand, all other packets depend on SIGNP for 
verification, i.e. { }0 2 2, ,...,SIGN NP P P −Φ = . If SIGNP  is lost, no packet will be verified, 
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SIGN n n n
n
SA d Vε π−
=
= Δ −∑ . Therefore, the 
signature packet is the most important packet with the highest sensitivity 
factor SIGN SIGN SIGNS SD SA= + . 
From Eq(5.6) and Eq(5.7), the sensitivity factor, together with the total size 
(including packet size and overhead size), determines the transmission policy which 
corresponds to the bandwidth allocation among the packets. In particular, the 
optimization process accounts for the distortion increment, packet size, deadline, 
authentication importance and overhead size for each packet to generate the optimal 
policy that minimizes the distortion of authenticated video at the receiver. In the 
resulting policy, a packet will have more transmission opportunities if its Lagrange 
multiplier is smaller, i.e. smaller size and greater sensitivity factor.  
Searching for the optimal transmission policy is computationally expensive, 
due to the dependency imposed by graph-based authentication. The iterative process 
has to run for multiple iterations before the Lagrangian value converges. For instance, 
the complexity of the proposed method is in the order of Ni*N*(C+2M), where Ni is 
the number of iterations that the optimization algorithm performs before convergence 
(typically in the order of 2-5), and N is the number of packets considered for 
transmission. The term C is the complexity of computing the sensitivity factor for a 
packet, and it depends on the size of the determining set and dependent set. The term 
M is the number of transmission opportunities in the Markov decision process. The 
computational complexity is exacerbated by the fact that the optimization algorithm 
has to run at every transmission opportunity. 
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5.1.1 Low-Complexity Optimization Algorithm 
We propose a low-complexity algorithm for selecting the packets for transmission. At 
each transmission opportunity, packets are selected in the following four steps. 
1. In the first step, for the signature packets, their current action in the transmission 
policy is set to “SEND” if they have never been sent before, or their last 
transmission is more than one round-trip time ago. Note that setting the current 
action to “SEND” does not necessary mean that it will be transmitted in this 
transmission opportunity. The steps below may change the action. The purpose of 
this step is to avoid the deadlock scenario where a packet A with higher distortion 
increment (like I-frame packet in a video stream) depends on another packet B 
with lower distortion increment and higher authentication importance (like P-
frame packet serving as signature packet) for verification. At the very beginning 
when neither packet has been transmitted and their transmission policies are 
initialized to “NO SEND”, the sensitivity factor (to be computed in next step) of 
packet B is very small, because A is not yet transmitted and its importance is not 
reflected in B’s sensitivity factor. On the other hand, the sensitivity factor of 
packet A is zero because A would not be verified as B has not yet been 
transmitted. Thus, this forms a deadlock scenario, where both packets have small 
sensitivity factor and, therefore, neither packet has much chance to get 
transmitted. Note that this is not a problem in the original proposed R-D-A 
optimization algorithm, because it will run for many iterations starting from the 
initial all-“SEND” policy. 
2. In step 2, based on the transmission history of the other packets and the actions set 
in Step 1, we can compute the sensitivity factor Sn using Eq(5.8) and Eq(5.9), and 
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hence the sensitivity per unit is ( )n n nS B O+ , which is the ratio of the packet’s 
sensitivity factor over its total size. It accounts for the authentication importance, 
overhead size, distortion increment and packet size. 
3. In step 3, the sensitivity factor per unit is adjusted based on the transmission 
history and the remaining time before its playout deadline. If the deadline is less 
than one forward-trip time away from current time, the adjusted sensitivity per 
unit cost is set to 0, because it makes no difference to send the packet. Otherwise, 
the sensitivity per unit cost is multiplied by a factor ( )( ) ( )1 x yf f r fτ ε ε ε ε= − , 
where fε and rε are forward and round-trip loss probabilities, x is the number of 
previous transmissions that are more than one round-trip time ago and y is the 
number of previous transmissions that are less than one round-trip time ago. The 
sensitivity factor is discounted by f rε ε for each transmission that is more than 
one round-trip time ago and by fε for each transmission that is less than one 
round-trip time ago. 
4. Finally, in step 4 the packets are sorted in decreasing order of adjusted sensitivity 
per unit. Based on this rank ordering, we choose to send the first k packets whose 
size in total does not exceed the transmission budget. 
This low-complexity optimization algorithm requires no iteration and it only 
needs to compute the sensitivity per unit for every packet. At each transmission 
opportunity, the complexity is N*C, where N is the number of considered packets and 
C is the complexity to compute a sensitivity factor. Recall that the R-D-A 
Optimization algorithm has a complexity of Ni*N*(C+2M), where Ni is the number of 
iterations, and M is the number of transmission opportunities in the Markov decision 
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process. Therefore, the proposed low-complexity algorithm has significantly reduced 
complexity. 
5.2 R-D-A OPTIMIZATION WITH MULTIPLE DEADLINES 
Using graph-based stream authentication, a packet Pn may be used to verify a number 
of other packets, which are referred to as the dependent set nΦ  of Pn. Therefore, 
assuming all packets in nΦ  have a later playout deadline, the packet Pn is associated 
with 1nΦ + deadlines, the first one is its own playout deadline and the others are 
playout deadlines of the packets in nΦ . Accordingly, the packet Pn will have 1nΦ +  
error probabilities, for instance, ( ),n nε π ′  is used to denote the probability that Pn 
does not arrive by the playout deadline of packet nP ′ . 
As in the R-D-A optimization with a single deadline, we still use an iterative 
descent algorithm to search for the optimized transmission policy. For each packet, 
the optimized transmission policy is determined by Eq(5.12). 
 ( ) ( )* ,arg min ,
n n n n n
n n n n n
P P or P
v n
π




′= + ∑  (5.12) 
The term ,n nv ′
 can be computed by ( ) ( ), , ,n n n n n n n nv SA SD B Oλ′ ′ ′= + + , where 
,n nSA ′ and ,n nSD ′ are the authentication importance and decoding importance of packet 
Pn with respect to the playout deadline of nP ′ . Note that the decoding importance is 
zero for all deadlines except the first one, as we assume the error concealment and 
coding dependency are implicitly accounted for by the distortion increment ndΔ  as in 
[41]. The decoding importance is computed using Eq(5.13), where Vn is the 
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verification probability of Pn and ( ),SIGN nε π ′ is the error probability of the signature 













⎧ ′ ′− Δ =⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
 (5.13) 
The arrival of packet Pn will benefit the verification of the packets in nΦ with 
playout deadline later than or equal to the arrival time of Pn. Thus, the authentication 
importance ,n nSA ′ can be computed using Eq(5.14), where 
n
nα ′′ is the influence packet 
Pn has on the verification probability of packet nP ′′ . 
 ( )( ) ( )( ),
:
1 , 1 ,
n n n
n
n n SIGN n n n
P T T










Figure 5-1 – Search space in single-deadline and multiple-deadline R-D-A optimization 
(transmission interval = 100ms) 
 
Suppose a packet has 4 deadlines, out of which the first deadline is its playout 
deadline T0, as shown in Figure 5-1. In single-deadline R-D-A optimization, the 
packet is only considered for transmission in the first 4 transmission opportunities, 
while in multiple-deadline R-D-A optimization, it is still considered for transmission 
even after T0. This will increase the verification probability of other packets with 
dependence on the given packet, and therefore improve the quality of the 
authenticated video. 
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On the other hand, the consideration of multiple deadlines drastically increases 
the complexity, as the search space grows exponentially with the number of 
transmission opportunities. This is illustrated in Figure 5-1, where in this example the 
multiple-deadline R-D-A optimization has to search 210 possible transmission 
policies, compared with 24 possibilities for the single-deadline case. 
5.2.1 Low-complexity Optimization Algorithm 
We next examine two methods to reduce the complexity associated with multiple-
deadline R-D-A optimization. The first method (referred to as window-split method) 
is to split the transmission window into two segments: the first segment lasts until T0-
k and the second segment starts from T0-k and ends at the last deadline, where k is the 
minimum forward propagation delay. In each time segment, the R-D-A optimization 
searches transmission possibilities within the segment only, although it still accounts 
for multiple error probabilities with respect to all deadlines. This greatly reduces the 
search space, e.g. the search space is reduced from 210 to 24+26 in Figure 5-1. 
The single-deadline R-D-A optimization method seldom transmits a packet in 
the time interval [T0-tavg, T0], as transmission in this interval does not increase the 
probability of being received before T0, where tavg is the average forward transmission 
time. However, the window-split method still transmits the packet in this interval due 
to two reasons: 1) The consideration of multiple deadlines increases the authentication 
importance of those packets with a large number of dependent packets and, therefore, 
increases its chance of being transmitted; 2) In the first segment, the window-split 
method assumes no transmission after deadline T0 (while, in fact, there can still be 
transmissions after T0) and, therefore, it forces the transmission of a packet even as it 
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approaches T0, adversely effecting other packets whose deadlines have not yet been 
reached. 
We also find that the gain from transmitting a packet after its first deadline T0 
decays very fast. Therefore, we propose the second method (referred to as extended-
window method) to simply extend the transmission window to time TW, where 
T0≤TW≤TM, where TM is the last deadline. A packet is not considered for transmission 
after TW. The length of the extended window is chosen so that it has acceptable 
complexity while still maintaining most of the gain from the use of multiple 
deadlines. 
5.3 R-D-A OPTIMIZATION WITH SPECIFIC AUTHENTICATION 
METHODS 
This section describes how to realize the proposed R-D-A Optimization with various 
graph-based authentication methods. In particular, we illustrate the computation of 
decoding importance, authentication importance and overhead size, which can be 
substituted into Eq(5.6) and Eq(5.7) to compute the optimized transmission policy. 
In the previous sections, we assume that for any packet n nP ′ ∈Φ , its 
verification probability is a linear function of the loss probability of packet nP , as in 
Eq(5.1). This is true for Simple Hash Chain, Tree-authentication and Butterfly 
authentication, which can be directly incorporated into the proposed R-D-A 
Optimization framework. However, for authentication methods like EMSS and 
Augmented Chain, it is more difficult to compute the verification dependency and 
authentication importance in closed form. Nevertheless, one can still take a 
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simulation-based empirical approach to estimate the verification probability and 
authentication importance. 
5.3.1 R-D-A Optimization with Tree-Authentication  
With Tree-authentication, each packet carries the signature and the hashes of its 
sibling nodes along its paths to the root. Thus, each packet is individually verifiable, 
i.e. there is no authentication dependency among the packets. As such, for a packet 
Pn, its authentication importance is 0 (SAn=0), its decoding importance is simply the 
associated distortion increment (SDn= ndΔ ), and its overhead size is g+h*log2N, where 
N  is the total number of packets. Therefore, in this case, the R-D-A Optimization is 
very similar to conventional RaDiO with the only exception of authentication 
overhead. 
Note that Tree-authentication does not impose any authentication dependency, 
resulting in very low complexity. In this case, the complexity is the same as lower-
complexity RaDiO using DC0 [39]. At each transmission opportunity, we simply sort 
the packets in decreasing order of ( )n n nd B OΔ +  and choose to send the first k 
packets whose size in total does not exceed the transmission budget. 
5.3.2 R-D-A Optimization with Simple Hash Chain 
Given N packets connected as a hash chain as shown in Figure 2-3, a packet Pn can be 
verified, if and only if, all preceding packets are received. The determining set of Pn 
is { }| 0n nP n nϕ ′ ′= ≤ < , the dependent set of Pn is { }| 2n nP n n N′ ′Φ = < ≤ − , and the 
 118 






V ε π− ′
′=
= −∑ . Therefore, the decoding 
importance of Pn can be computed using Eq(5.10). Furthermore, for any packet 
n nP ′ ∈Φ , its verification probability nV ′  is a linear function of ( )nε π , as shown in 
Eq(5.15). 
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′′ ′≤ <′′≠
= − + = = −∑  (5.15) 
Substituting Eq(5.15) into Eq(5.11), we can obtain the authentication 
importance. The overhead size is g+h for the signature packet Psig, 0 for the last 
packet PN-2, and h for the rest. 
Therefore, the decoding importance, authentication importance and overhead 
size can be substituted into Eq(5.6) and Eq(5.7) to compute the optimized 
transmission policy. 
5.3.3 R-D-A Optimization with Butterfly Authentication 
Given N packets (assuming 1R CN N N= +  and 2log 1C RN N= + ) connected as a 
butterfly authentication graph, the first packet is the signature packet, the rest of the 
packets are divided into CN  columns and each column has RN  packets. Let us denote 
packet Pn as Pc,r, where c is the column number, r is the packet index within a column, 
and Rn cN r= + . The signature packet PSIGN contains the hashes of all packet in 
column 0, packet Pc,r has its hash appended to Pc-1,r and 1,c rP ′− , where r and r′  are 
( )1CN − -bit numbers differing only at the (c-1)th most significant bit. Pc,r is verifiable 
if either Pc-1,r or 1,c rP ′− is received and verified. Thus, its verification probability Vc,r 
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can be expressed using the loss probability and verification probability of connected 
packets in the previous column, as in Eq(5.16). 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1, 1, 1, 1,
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 (5.16) 
For packet Pc,r, its determining set ,c rϕ includes all packets to which Pc,r has a 
directed path in the butterfly graph, i.e., { }, , , ,| 0 , pathc r c r c r c rP c c P Pϕ ′ ′ ′ ′′= ≤ < ⎯⎯⎯→ ; its 
dependent set ,c rΦ  includes all packets that has a path to Pc,r, 
i.e. { }, , 2 , ,log , pathc r c r c r c rP c c K P P′ ′ ′ ′′Φ = < ≤ ⎯⎯⎯→ . For example, in Figure 3-1, 
{ }1,1 0,1 0,5,P Pϕ = and { }1,1 2,1 2,3 3,0 3,1 3,2 3,3, , , , ,P P P P P PΦ = . 
By iteratively applying Eq(5.16), Vc,r can be expressed using loss probabilities 
of all packets in its determining set ,c rϕ , which can be substituted into Eq(5.10) to 
compute the decoding importance of packet Pc,r. 
Lemma 1: In the butterfly authentication graph, if packet ,c rP ′ ′ depends on 
packet ,c rP  for verification, i.e. , ,c r c rP ′ ′ ∈Φ , the dependent set of ,c rP ′ ′  is a subset of the 
dependent set of ,c rP , i.e. , ,c r c r′ ′Φ ⊆ Φ . Similarly, if the packet ,c rP depends on ,c rP ′ ′ for 
verification, i.e. , ,c r c rP ϕ′ ′ ∈ , the determining set of ,c rP ′ ′ is a subset of the determining 
set of ,c rP , i.e. , ,c r c rϕ ϕ′ ′ ⊆ . 
Proof: The first statement can be proved as follows: Let ,c rP ′′ ′′be any packet 
in ,c r′ ′Φ . As ,c rP ′′ ′′has a path to ,c rP ′ ′  which in turn has a path to ,c rP , ,c rP ′′ ′′ also has a path 
to ,c rP , i.e. , ,c r c rP ′′ ′′ ∈Φ . Therefore, , ,c r c r′ ′Φ ⊆ Φ . The second statement can be proved 
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as follows: Let ,c rP ′′ ′′  be any packet in ,c rϕ ′ ′ . As ,c rP has path to ,c rP ′ ′  which in turn has 
path to ,c rP ′′ ′′ , there is path from ,c rP  to ,c rP ′′ ′′ , i.e. , ,c r c rP ϕ′′ ′′ ∈ . Therefore, , ,c r c rϕ ϕ′ ′ ⊆ . 
The dependency relationship in Butterfly authentication graph has the 
transition property. In short, if packet A depends on packet B which in turn depends 
on packet C, then A also depends on C. 
Lemma 2: In a Butterfly authentication graph, for any packet ,c rP ′ ′
 in the 
dependent set of ,c rP , i.e., , ,c r c rP ′ ′ ∈Φ , its verification probability ,c rV ′ ′ can be expressed 
as a linear function of the loss probability of ,c rP , i.e., ( ), ,, , , ,c r c rc r c r c r c rV α ε π β′ ′ ′ ′′ ′ = − + , 
where ,,
c r
c rα ′ ′  and ,,c rc rβ ′ ′  are positive numbers.  
Proof: This lemma can be proved using the induction method in two steps: 
First, when 1c c′ = + , for any packet 1, ,c r c rP ′+ ∈Φ , it is obvious from Eq(5.16) that 
( )1, 1,1, , , ,c r c rc r c r c r c rV α ε π β′ ′+ +′+ = − + with ( )( )( )1,, , , ,1 1c rc r c r c k c kV Vα ε π′+ = − −  and 
( )( ) ( )( )1,, , , , , , ,1 1c rc r c r c k c k c r c k c kV V V Vβ ε π ε π′+ = + − − − , where k and r are ( )1CN − -bit 
numbers that differ only at the cth most significant bit. Thus, the statement is true 
when 1c c′ = + . Second, suppose the statement is true for , ,c r c rP ′ ′ ∈Φ , i.e. 
( ), ,, , , ,c r c rc r c r c r c rV α ε π β′ ′ ′ ′′ ′ = − + . For any packet 1, ,c r c rP ′ ′′ ′ ′+ ∈Φ , it is obvious from Eq(5.16) 
that 1, ,c r c rV aV b′ ′′ ′ ′+ = + , where a and b are positive numbers. Thus, the verification 
probability of 1,c rP ′ ′′+ can be written as ( )1, 1,1, , , ,c r c rc r c r c r c rV α ε π β′ ′′ ′ ′′+ +′ ′′+ = − + , 
where 1, ,, ,
c r c r
c r c raα α′ ′′ ′ ′+ = and  1, ,, ,c r c rc r c ra bβ β′ ′′ ′ ′+ = + . From Lemma 1 we know that 
1, ,c r c rP ′ ′′+ ∈Φ . Therefore, this Lemma is proved. 
 121 
Lemma 2 says that the authentication probability of a packet in the dependent 
set of packet ,c rP  can be expressed as a linear function of the loss probability of 




c rα ′ ′ on any packet 
, ,c r c rP ′ ′ ∈Φ , which can be substituted into Eq(5.11) to compute the authentication 
importance of ,c rP . 
In a Butterfly authentication graph with 1R CN N N= + packets, the signature 
packet contains the digital signature and hashes of all packets in column-0, thereby 
the Overhead Size of PSIGN is SIGN RO g N h= + , where g and h denote signature size 
and hash size, respectively. The packets in the last column do not contain any hash, 








≤ <⎧= ⎨ =⎩
 (5.17) 
Therefore, we can substitute the decoding importance, authentication 
importance and overhead size into Eq(5.6) and Eq(5.7) to compute the optimal 
transmission policy. 
5.4 ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, the proposed R-D-A Optimization technique is benchmarked against 
1) authentication-unaware RaDiO technique coupled with graph-based 
authentication, and; 2) straightforward streaming of video data protected by a graph-
based authentication method. 
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5.4.1 Experiment Setup 
We consider a video streaming scenario where every received packet is acknowledged 
by the receiver and re-transmission is driven by the sender. A packet is discarded if it 
is not delivered or verified before its deadline. Our experiments use the same settings 
to [38][41][39] for media streaming. Specifically, the network is assumed to be a 
packet-erasure channel, where a packet is either correctly received or lost. The packet 
loss and delay are random and independent in the forward and backward channel. 
Packet loss follows a uniform distribution (the packet loss rate is denoted byε ) while 
packet delay follows a shifted Gamma distribution with parameter k (constant delay in 
the network path), n (number of routers in the network path), 1/α (mean queuing delay 
per router), and 1/α2 (variance of the queuing delay per router). In our experiments, 
the forward and backward channels are modeled as having the same loss rate and 
delay distribution: the loss rate ε  is set to 0.03, 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2, as recommended by 
JVT for error resilience testing [87], the delay parameters are set to k = 50ms, n = 2 
and 1/α = 25ms. The interval between two consecutive transmission opportunities is 
100ms and playout delay is δ = 600ms. At any time t, only those packets whose 
deadline is in window [t+k, t+k+δ] are eligible for transmission. NS-2 [89] is used for 
the simulation. For RaDiO streaming, the Lagrange multiplier λ is used to control the 
transmission rate (recall that smaller λ  results in higher transmitted bit rate) and is 
fixed for one streaming session. 
Two QCIF video sequences, Foreman (400 frames) and Container (300 
frames), are encoded using H.264/ACV reference software JM 10.2 [90] at around 
150Kbps and 70Kbps respectively. We select these two sequences in our experiment, 
namely Foreman with fast motion, and Container with slow motion. The frame rate is 
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30 frames per second and each GOP comprises one I-frame followed by 14 P-frames. 
For the convenience of network transmission, each frame is divided into slices (or 
slice NAL units) based on the coding length. As such, an I-frame may be divided into 
more than one slice while a P-frame may comprise one slice only. A slice is wrapped 
by one RTP packet, similar to the single NAL unit mode in [91]. The parameter sets 
(including sequence parameter set and picture parameter set) are transmitted out-of-
band. Other NAL unit types, like SEI and EOS [6] are not used here. In addition, no 
slice NAL unit shall exceed 1200 bytes and the network MTU is set to 1500 bytes. 
The space of 300 bytes is reserved for authentication overhead (signatures and hashes 
appended) and RTP/UDP/IP headers (around 40 bytes). Therefore, no packet 
segmentation is required in the network. 
For authentication, we use SHA-1 Hash (128-bit) and RSA Signature (1024-
bit) [18] to construct authentication graphs like EMSS, Augmented Chain and 
Butterfly, which are all configured with their respective optimal parameters. A 
signature is amortized among a group of 33 consecutive packets, corresponding to 
around one-second of video data. As such, for an overhead size of 2 hashes per packet 
and frame rate of 30 frames per second, the authentication overhead constitutes 
around 8Kbps of extra data rate, on top of the data rate of the original video. 
In total, we implemented six systems described as follows: 
1. The first system, Dumb-AC, implements a straightforward transmission of video 
packets protected with Augmented Chain which is claimed optimal for generic 
data stream [34]. If there is sufficient bandwidth, the sender will re-transmit the 
packets that has been sent but not yet acknowledged. Dumb-AC is the baseline 
system in our experiments. 
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2. The second system, RaDiO, implements authentication-unaware RaDiO for un-
authenticated video, whose performance is used as the upper bound for all other 
systems. We measure the R-D performance for un-authenticated video with 1) no 
loss and no delay; 2) loss but no delay, and; 3) loss and delay, which can 
demonstrate the impact of network loss and delay on the R-D performance. 
3. The third system, R-D-A-Opt-Butterfly, implements our proposed R-D-A 
optimized streaming and Butterfly Authentication. We choose Butterfly 
Authentication because Simple Hash Chain is not robust against packet loss while 
Tree-authentication has too high authentication overhead. The performance of R-
D-A-Opt-Butterfly is used to validate our proposed R-D-A Optimization 
technique. 
4. The fourth system, RaDiO-Butterfly, implements authentication-unaware RaDiO 
and Butterfly Authentication. This system is used to benchmark the R-D-A 
Optimization technique. 
5. The fifth system, RaDiO-EMSS, implements authentication-unaware RaDiO and 
EMSS. 
6. The sixth system, RaDiO-AC, implements authentication-unaware RaDiO and 
Augmented Chain. 
These last two systems are used to demonstrate that the proposed R-D-A 
Optimization outperforms authentication-unaware RaDiO not only for Butterfly 
Authentication but also for other authentication methods, out of which Augmented 
Chain is claimed to be optimal for generic data authentication. In our experiments, 
EMSS and Augmented Chain were slightly modified. The modified graphs have 
exactly the same structure as the original ones, except that the signature packet is the 
first packet (instead of the last one) and the original forward edges are pointing 
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backward. This minor modification has two advantages: 1) the authentication 
dependency is to align with the frame prediction dependency, because the edges point 
backward; 2) This modification helps to reduce receiver delay, although it also 
increases sender delay. Recall that for media streams that are pre-stored at the sender, 
receiver delay is more critical than sender delay. 
Note that Augmented Chain and Butterfly Authentication have fixed overhead 
size (i.e. 2 hashes per packet) while EMSS has tunable overhead size. As such, in the 
RaDiO-EMSS system, we empirically determine the optimal overhead size that 
produces the best R-D performance. Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3 give the R-D curves of 
RaDiO-EMSS at different overhead sizes (2-5 hashes per packet) and different loss 
rates (0.03, 0.1 and 0.2) for Foreman and Container, respectively. Note that due to 
space limitation we omit the set of R-D curves at loss rate 0.05, which has a similar 
R-D performance gap. With higher overhead size, the packets have higher verification 
probability. On the other hand, the extra overhead also shifts its R-D curve to the 
right, because overhead is counted toward the total bit rate. The benefit gained from 
the higher verification probability does not compensate for the bit rate increment due 
to extra overhead. Therefore, increasing the overhead size does not improve its R-D 
performance for RaDiO-EMSS. In subsequent experiments, we use the optimal 
overhead size of 2 hashes per packet for RaDiO-EMSS. 
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Figure 5-2 – Authentication-unaware RaDiO and EMSS authentication at different 
overhead sizes and different packet loss rates (0.03, 0,1 and 0.2), Foreman QCIF 
 
 
Figure 5-3 – Authentication-unaware RaDiO and EMSS authentication at different 
overhead sizes and different packet loss rates (0.03, 0,1 and 0.2), Container QCIF 
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5.4.2 R-D-A Optimization with Single Deadline 
The R-D performance of the six systems are given in Figure 5-4 (ε =0.03, Foreman), 
Figure 5-5 (ε =0.03, Container), Figure 5-6 (ε =0.05, Foreman), Figure 5-7 (ε =0.05, 
Container), Figure 5-8 ( ε =0.1, Foreman), Figure 5-9 ( ε =0.1, Container), Figure 
5-10 ( ε =0.2, Foreman) and Figure 5-11( ε =0.2, Container). The authentication-
unaware techniques like RaDiO-EMSS, RaDiO-AC and RaDiO-Butterfly do not 
perform well at low rates, as the Y-PSNRs drop quickly to unacceptable levels due to 
the lack of awareness of authentication. When bandwidth is scarce, packets with 
smaller distortion increments will have less transmission opportunities, and thereby 
lead to low probability of reception. However, these packets might be very important 
for verifying other packets and their loss will greatly degrade the video quality. The 
steep slope and quick dropoff in performance for the authentication-unaware RaDiO 
techniques may be reduced by increasing the packets’ verification probability, but this 
would require significant additional authentication overhead which would negatively 
impact the overall R-D performance. This is also demonstrated in Figure 5-2 and 
Figure 5-3 which shows the R-D curves of RaDiO-EMSS with different overhead 
sizes. At higher overhead size, although the performance dropoff is slightly slower, 
the R-D curve is shifted towards the right (lower performance). 
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Figure 5-4 – R-D curves for various systems (packet loss rate = 0.03), Foreman QCIF 
 
 




Figure 5-6 – R-D curves for various system (packet loss rate = 0.05), Foreman QCIF 
 
 




Figure 5-8 – R-D curves for various system (packet loss rate = 0.1), Foreman QCIF 
 
 




Figure 5-10 – R-D curves for various system (packet loss rate = 0.2), Foreman QCIF 
 
 
Figure 5-11 – R-D curves for various system (packet loss rate = 0.2), Container QCIF 
 
An interesting observation is the performance difference between Dumb-AC 
and authentication-unaware RaDiO techniques for the different sequences Container 
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and Foreman. For the Foreman video, the packet distortion increments vary 
drastically among packets and, therefore, the authentication-unaware RaDiO 
techniques exploit this to provide better performance than Dumb-AC. In the Container 
video, the ship is moving slowly at constant velocity and hence the packet distortion 
increments have small variance, i.e. most packets have approximately similar 
distortion increments. Therefore, the authentication-unaware RaDiO and Dumb-AC 
techniques have similar performances, and in some cases the Dumb-AC has slightly 
better performance, which is perhaps due to the randomness of the pattern of 
delivered packets.  
As shown in Figure 5-4, Figure 5-5, Figure 5-6, Figure 5-7, Figure 5-8, Figure 
5-9, Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11, R-D-A-Opt-Butterfly outperforms all systems, 
because it computes the transmission policy based on both packet distortion 
increments and authentication importance. At low bandwidth, the authentication-
unaware RaDiO does not work anymore as its R-D curves drop quickly to 
unacceptable levels. Nevertheless, at the same low bandwidth the proposed R-D-A 
Optimization technique is still a workable solution whose R-D curves drop gracefully 
in parallel with the upper bound, RaDiO for unauthenticated video. However, we still 
notice that there is a performance gap between RaDiO and R-D-A-Opt-Butterfly. The 
possible reasons could be: 1) R-D-A-Opt-Butterfly has extra data rate due to the 
overhead size (the overhead constitutes 8Kbps data rate on top of the data rate of the 
coded video); 2) the packet authentication importance is not fully aligned with the 
distortion increments. If we could design an authentication graph such that packet 
authentication importance and distortion increments are fully aligned, the horizontal 
gap between RaDiO and RaDiO_Butterfly_Aware should be reduced to the data rate 
of authentication overhead (i.e. 8Kbps). However, this task constitutes future work, as 
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there are many constraints on the graph topology (due to factors like frame prediction, 
playout sequence, etc) and we cannot arbitrarily rearrange the packets in the 
authentication graph. 
As a further observation to understand the plots, from the sender’s point of 
view, the channel capacity is ( )21 CRε− , where CR  is the channel bandwidth, because 
the sender considers a packet as successfully delivered only after the packet is 
acknowledged by the receiver. Therefore, to transmit all packets at source rate SR , the 
required bandwidth is ( )21SR ε− . More sophisticated acknowledgement schemes 
can reduce this required bandwidth to close to ( )1SR ε− (depending on the playout 
delay), however, we keep the current approach for conceptual simplicity. When 
channel bandwidth drops below ( )21SR ε− , the Y-PSNR of authenticated video 
starts to drop, which is validated by all R-D curves provided. For example, in Figure 
5-4, the source rate is 158Kbps including 150Kbps for video data and 8Kbps for 
authentication overhead, so the knee of the R-D curve of R-D-A-Opt-Butterfly is 
located at 158/(1-0.03)2=168Kbps when the loss rate is 0.03. Similarly, when the loss 
rate is 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2, the knee of the R-D curve is 175Kbps in Figure 5-6, 195Kbps 
in Figure 5-8 and 246Kbps in Figure 5-10, respectively. Similar observations exist for 
the Container sequence in Figure 5-5, Figure 5-7, Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-11. 
5.4.2.1 Low-complexity R-D-A Optimization Algorithm 
We also implement the low-complexity streaming of authentication video, as 
described in Section 5.1.1. Figure 5-12 and Figure 5-13 compares the performance of 
optimized streaming (R-D-A-Opt-Butterfly) and low-complexity (R-D-A-Opt-
Butterfly-LC) streaming, both using butterfly authentication. Note that we omit the R-
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D curve at loss rate 0.05 due to space limitation, however, it has similar trends with 
other loss rates. At lower bandwidth, the low-complexity algorithm has an R-D curve 
close to the optimized algorithm, because it is able to identify those packets with 
substantially higher importance. However, the performance gap increases with 
bandwidth, because the low-complexity algorithm has limited capability to 
differentiate among the low-importance packets which do not vary much in their 
associated importance. In addition, the performance gap also increases with the packet 
loss rates. At lower loss rate, there is little uncertainty of packet delivery and hence 
the low-complexity algorithm achieves R-D performance close to the optimized 
algorithm. At higher loss rates, there is higher uncertainty and the low-complexity 
algorithm is, therefore, unable to handle the situation, leading to poorer performance. 
 
Figure 5-12 – R-D curves of R-D-A-Opt-Butterfly and R-D-A-Opt-Butterfly-LC (Packet 




Figure 5-13 – R-D curves of R-D-A-Opt-Butterfly and R-D-A-Opt-Butterfly-LC (Packet 
loss rate = 0.03, 0.1 and 0.2), Container QCIF 
5.4.3 R-D-A Optimization with Multiple Deadlines 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed multiple-deadline R-D-A optimization 
algorithms, we compare three methods: 1) single-deadline (SD); 2) multiple-deadline 
with window-split; 3) multiple-deadline with extended-window. The experiment 
settings are exactly the same as those described in Section 5.4.1, with the only 
exception that playout delay is reduced to 400ms to show the effect of considering 
multiple deadlines. 
Figure 5-14 and Figure 5-15 compares the PSNR performances of the three 
methods using test video sequences Foreman and Container, respectively. The two 
multiple-deadline methods outperform the single-deadline method by up to 4dB. The 
reason can be found from the statistics in  
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80.4 99.3 4.5 
99.01 
0.99 






80.36 99.5 4.9 
 
Table 5-1 The window-split method and extended window method have higher 
verification probability than the single-deadline method, due to re-transmission of 
expired but still important packets. Note that while the single-deadline method has a 
higher fraction of its received packets delivered before the playout deadline, its 
receiving probability before playout deadline is lower than the other two. This results 
from an unbalanced bandwidth distribution, i.e. certain packets are given too much 
bandwidth, while other packets are starved. This occurs because some packets never 
get a chance to be transmitted, as the packet(s) they depend on for verification is 
either lost or not transmitted, and then the single deadline R-D-A algorithm realizes 
that the packet in question should not be transmitted, given the single-deadline 
constraint. The multiple-deadline R-D-A algorithm provides valuable transmission 
flexibility which overcomes the above inefficiencies.  It is also interesting to note that 
the two multiple deadline algorithms transmit a sizable percentage of the packets after 
their playout deadline (4.5% and 4.9%). 
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows: 
 We propose an R-D-A Optimized streaming technique that computes the 
transmission policy to minimize the expected distortion of the authenticated video 
at the receiver. This is achieved by accounting for the authentication importance 
and overhead size, in addition to the original distortion increment and packet size 
used in conventional authentication-unaware RaDiO. In addition, we also show 
how to realize the proposed R-D-A Optimization using various authentication 
methods. Simulation results demonstrate that the R-D-A Optimization has the best 
R-D performance among all systems. Indeed, the authentication-unaware RaDiO 
systems do not work at low bandwidths, as the video quality drops quickly to 
unacceptable levels. 
 Considering that R-D-A optimization has high complexity, we propose a low-
complexity algorithm. Experimental results show that the low-complexity 
algorithm performs well at low bandwidth and low loss rates, compared with the 
optimized algorithm. 
 We also show how to account for the multiple deadlines provided by the 
authentication graph, and evaluate the performance improvement of multiple-
deadline versus single-deadline optimization for the proposed R-D-A Optimized 
streaming technique. 
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CHAPTER 6 -  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Media delivery and streaming over public networks are becoming practically more 
and more important, enabled by rapidly increasing network bandwidth, huge number 
of Internet users, advanced media compression standards and advanced network 
delivery technologies. It has a wide range of applications, including VoD, VoIP, 
IPTV, video conferencing, P2PTV and so on. However, security issues like 
authentication are serious concern for many users. Both the sender and the receiver in 
a streaming session would like to be assured that the received media is not modified 
by any unauthorized attacker and that malicious modification, if any, should be 
detected. 
Traditional crypto-based authentication methods, like DSS, do not work well 
for streaming media due to the following reasons: 
• Crypto-based DSS is not tolerant of network loss and even a single-bit difference 
may cause the received media not to pass the verification. However, the streaming 
media is usually encoded with error-resilient techniques and is tolerant to certain 
level of network loss, which is unavoidable when delivered over an unreliable 
channel like an UDP connection. 
• Crypto-based DSS has high complexity and overhead, which imposes extra 
burden for the network as well as the sender and the receiver. This is exacerbated 
by the fact that the streaming media is huge in size and already takes a lot of 
bandwidth for transmission and computation resource for encoding and decoding. 
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• Crypto-based DSS does not support the paradigm of continuous verification as the 
streaming packets are being delivered. This is very important for a media 
streaming system, which is essentially a “play-as-being-received” technique. 
In this thesis, we first propose a Butterfly Authentication method, which 
amortizes a digital signature among a group of packets, by connecting them as a 
butterfly graph. The Butterfly Authentication method has lower complexity, because 
it requires only one signature operation and around 2N hashing operations for a group 
of N packets. (Note that the complexity of a hashing operation is 3 orders of 
magnitude lower than that of a signature operation). It also has lower overhead, 
corresponding to 1 digital signature and 2N  hash values for N packets. Note a hash 
(in the order of ten bytes) is much smaller than a digital signature (in the order of 
hundred bytes). In addition, the Butterfly Authentication method has very high 
verification probability because each packet in a butterfly graph is connected to two 
other packets that are independent of each other for verification, which maximize its 
verification probability. We experimentally show that the Butterfly Authentication 
method achieves near-optimal performance in terms of verification probability when 
overhead is fixed at around 2 hashes per packet. 
Nevertheless, the Butterfly Authentication method has some limitations: 1) the 
total number of packets in a butterfly graph is not flexible; 2) the overhead is not 
flexible; 3) the signature packet grows with the total number of packets in the graph. 
To overcome the above 3 limitations, we also propose the Generalized Butterfly 
Graph (GBG) for authentication. The GBG graph supports arbitrary overhead and an 
arbitrary number of packets, and the signature packet does not have to grow with the 
total number of packets. The GBG framework includes a wide range of possible 
authentication graphs, and the problem of finding the best graph for a given situation 
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corresponds to a design problem. Given the total number of packets, packet loss rate 
and overhead budget, we need to find the optimized graph configurations like the 
number of rows/columns, edge placement and the number of transmission for 
signature packet. We also propose algorithms to solve the design problem based on 
the analysis and observation of GBG graph. Experimental results demonstrate that the 
GBG authentication method has significant performance improvement over existing 
graph-based methods. 
We also proposed a Content-aware Optimized Stream Authentication method 
by recognizing the fact that packets have unequal importance in a media stream and 
that the average verification probability does not accurately reflect the quality of 
authenticated media. Therefore, the quality of authenticated media, besides the 
verification probability, should be used to measure the performance of the 
authentication methods. To make use of packets’ unequal importance, we formulate a 
distortion-overhead optimization framework to compute an authentication graph that 
minimizes the expected distortion of the authenticated media, for given overhead and 
packet loss rate. This optimized performance is achieved by systematically allocating 
more authentication information (or overhead) to those more important packets, and 
vice versa. In other words, the authentication overhead is used in a more efficient 
manner. In addition, the proposed method aligns the coding dependency and 
authentication dependency for generic layered media data, which eliminate the 
situation where a packet is either not verifiable or not decodable. The system analysis 
and simulation results demonstrate that the proposed Content-Aware Optimized 
Stream Authentication method achieve a R-D curve of the authenticated media which 
is very close to the upper bound, i.e. the R-D curve when no authentication is 
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required. In addition, it substantially outperforms existing stream authentication 
methods in terms of media quality at all packet loss rates. 
We also propose Rate-Distortion-Authentication (R-D-A) Optimized streaming 
method, which computes the optimized packet transmission policy that accounts for 
packet coding importance as well as authentication dependency. Here, the R-D-A 
optimization is defined as a rate-distortion optimization for authenticated media where 
the “rate” includes data rate for coded media data and authentication overhead, and 
the “distortion” is measured by the difference between the original media and the 
authenticated media. Considering that R-D-A optimization has high complexity, we 
also propose a low-complexity algorithm with performance close to the fully-blown 
algorithm. In addition, we also propose a R-D-A optimization algorithm that accounts 
for multiple deadlines associated with each packet. Compared with the 
straightforward concatenation of RaDiO and existing stream authentication methods, 
the proposed R-D-A Optimized streaming method has significantly better R-D 
performance. Indeed, it is the only method that works at low bandwidth. 
6.1 FUTURE RELATED RESEARCH ISSUES 
There are many more research issues to be solved in the field of authentication for 
streaming media over loss network. They include: 
• Joint streaming and authentication: Chapter 4 describes the Content-aware 
Optimized Stream Authentication method, which is used to find the optimal 
topology policy for a given packet transmission policy (assuming each packet is 
transmitted once and packet loss rate is known). On the other hand, in Chapter 5, 
the Rate-Distortion-Authentication Optimized streaming method is used to find 
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the optimal transmission policy for a given topology policy (i.e. authentication 
graph is fixed). The future work could be joint streaming and authentication, 
where the topology policy and transmission policy are jointly determined for a 
given bandwidth constraints. At the higher level, we need to decide how much 
bandwidth should be allocated to authentication and how much bandwidth should 
be allocated to channel coding (like packet re-transmission or FEC parity data).  
At the lower level, we need to allocate the authentication overhead and channel 
coding redundancy to individual packets. To solve this problem, the most vital 
step is to formulate the problem and also find ways to solve the problem with low 
complexity. We believe better performance could be achieved by joint streaming 
and authentication. 
• Authentication for real-time media streaming: Real-time media streaming like 
VoIP and video conferencing requires both low sender delay and low receiver 
delay, because the media packets have to be generated, transmitted and consumed 
in real-time. However, existing stream authentication methods have either long 
sender delay, or long receiver delay, or both. For instance, if the signature packet 
is the first packet to be transmitted as illustrated in Figure 2-3, the sender delay 
will be high; if the signature packet is the last packet to be transmitted as 
illustrated in Figure 2-4, the receiver delay will be high; if erasure-code is used for 
authentication as illustrated in Figure 2-2, both sender delay and receiver delay are 
high. Therefore, the future work should be focused on how to reduce the sender 
delay and receiver delay to meet the requirement of read-time streaming. 
• Alignment of coding dependency and authentication dependency: The Content-
aware Optimized Stream Authentication method in Chapter 4 aligns coding 
dependency and authentication dependency for generic layered media data with 
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simple dependency. However, there is much more complicated coding 
dependency. For example, Scalable Video Coding (SVC) video stream has 
dependency in three dimensions: temporal, spatial and quality. Even along the 
temporal dimension itself, the dependency graph could be as complicated as a 
hierarchical prediction structure. The future work should be focused on how to 
align the authentication dependency with those complicated coding dependency, 
which could help to significantly improve the quality of the authenticated media. 
• Stream authentication adaptive to channel conditions: With the Content-aware 
Optimized Stream Authentication methods, the authentication graph is designed 
based on a given network condition. However, the network condition may change 
depending on a variety of conditions, such as network congestion, fading 
phenomenon in wireless networks, traffic shaping by network operators, and so 
on. The future work could focus on how to make the authentication graph adaptive 
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